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Goldberg: First Amendment Cynicism and Redemption

FIRST AMENDMENT CYNICISM AND REDEMPTION
Erica Goldberg*

ABSTRACT
This article proposes a way out of the vicious cycle of “First
Amendment cynicism.” First Amendment cynicism is the disingenuous
application or non-application of the First Amendment to further political
ends unrelated to freedom of expression. The cycle is facilitated by either
accurate or inaccurate perceptions of First Amendment cynicism by one’s
political opponents.
As one example, the perception by those on the political left that the
right is applying the First Amendment cynically—turning the First
Amendment into the “New Lochner”—leads the left to lose faith in First
Amendment principles. Some on the left then engage in First Amendment
cynicism, not applying the First Amendment to those that harm their
agenda. This approach is then observed by the right, and the cycle
continues. Further, improper accusations of First Amendment cynicism,
or what this article terms “second-order First Amendment cynicism”
render this cycle ever more vicious.
To restore both the perception and the reality of a First Amendment
that serves the entire political spectrum, this article first demonstrates
why the increasing accusations of First Amendment cynicism are
overstated and ahistorical. Later, this article argues that the First
Amendment can be both nonpartisan—treating equally speech of all
political stripes—and apolitical—leading to outcomes and social
arrangements that favor no political ideology. The best way to ensure
that free speech doctrine remains nonpartisan and apolitical is to favor a
civil libertarian approach. However, courts should ensure that the First
Amendment is egalitarian in cases where the government must intervene,
such as cases involving speech on government land or cases involving the
heckler’s veto. Finally, this article proposes ways for the Supreme Court
to manage its docket and refine existing First Amendment doctrine so that
the First Amendment serves those who most need its protections.
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INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment, perhaps more than any other constitutional
provision, requires judges to apply its protections in a nonpartisan,
apolitical way.1 If judges make decisions about whether to protect speech
based on its underlying viewpoint or political valence, the purpose of free
speech doctrine is nullified as it is applied.2 Unfortunately, as judges and
1. The meaning of nonpartisan is “somewhat nebulous and incomplete.” George K. Yin,
Legislative Gridlock and Nonpartisan Staff, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2287, 2320 (2013). Nonpartisan, in
the sense of political impartiality, can be defined as “the absence of control by a self-interested individual
or political party.” Mark Fenster, Designing Transparency: The 9/11 Commission and Institutional Form,
65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1239, 1297 (2008). For greater exploration of whether the First Amendment can
be nonpartisan and apolitical, and distinctions between the two terms, see infra Part II.
2. The chief First Amendment evil is indeed censorship of views based on viewpoints. See R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“The First Amendment generally prevents government from
proscribing speech ... because of disapproval of the ideas expressed.”). Judges should no more be
empowered to prioritize certain views than legislators. See also Erica Goldberg, Free Speech
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partisans harshly criticize perceived misuses of free speech principles,3
society’s and even judges’ faith in the First Amendment, as a principled
tool that protects liberty and benefits all members of society, is eroding.4
In order to restore that necessary faith,5 this article seeks to demonstrate
that accusations of “First Amendment cynicism”6—the disingenuous
application or non-application of the First Amendment to further political
ends unrelated to freedom of expression—are overstated, and that the
First Amendment can be largely apolitical.7 This article further suggests
doctrinal solutions within our existing free speech framework, such as
disentangling free speech principles from economic liberties, clarifying
the speech/conduct distinction, and distinguishing compelled speech
protections from protections against the suppression of speech. These
alterations will help ensure that the First Amendment can benefit those
who most need its protections.
Because there is no real consensus about the purpose and scope of free
Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 720 (2016) (“[I]n the First Amendment context, allowing
judges to determine which speech is protected for ideological reasons or which speech harms bother them
personally would give courts the power to do something legislators cannot. Courts would then become
the censors instead of the government.”).
3. See infra Part I.
4. Just 25 years ago, one scholar wrote that “[w]ith all the cynicism in this country, however,
the first amendment seems to have been untarnished.” Steven H. Shiffrin, Racist Speech, Outsider
Jurisprudence, and the Meaning of America, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 97 n.264 (1994). This has changed
now. In Part I, this article outlines the accusations by both the left and the right of First Amendment
cynicism. In addition, some recent surveys show that society’s respect for free speech has diminished over
time, especially among younger adults and students. A 2016 study conducted by Gallup, the John S. and
James L. Knight Foundation and the Newseum Institute found that students increasingly wish to regulate
offensive speech and limit media access to campus protests. KNIGHT FOUND., FREE EXPRESSION ON
CAMPUS: WHAT COLLEGE STUDENTS THINK ABOUT FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES (2018),
https://knightfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Knight_Foundation_Free_Expression_on_Ca
mpus_2017.pdf; but see Matthew Yglasias, Everything We Think About the Political Correctness Debate
is
Wrong,
VOX
(Mar.
12,
2018
8:00
am),
https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2018/3/12/17100496/political-correctness-data.
5. Society’s perception that judges are applying the First Amendment in a principled way is
different than, but affected by, whether judges are actually performing their jobs in a non-cynical way.
Faith in our First Amendment jurisprudence is necessary to prevent a vicious cycle where those who
believe the First Amendment is being applied cynically are thus more willing to apply it cynically to
benefit their own political preferences.
6. In Part I, this article will more fully develop the concept of First Amendment cynicism and
also add to this typology the concept of second-order First Amendment cynicism—where accusations of
First Amendment cynicism are themselves are either demonstrably false or intended disingenuously to
achieve political ends unrelated to free speech. See infra Part I.
7. By apolitical, I mean that the political distribution of results that arise from protecting speech
does not favor one ideology over another. First Amendment doctrine is nonpartisan because it is
promulgated in a way that is facially neutral with respect to both the identity of the speaker and the
viewpoint of the underlying speech. In addition, free speech doctrine can be apolitical if application of
First Amendment law, given underlying social conditions, can distribute benefits among those of various
political stripes in a way that sufficiently approximates equality of political outcomes. An apolitical First
Amendment would not ultimately favor certain groups over other groups or be more likely to advance
certain agendas over other agendas. See infra Part II.
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speech rights, there is vast and growing discord about proper and
improper uses of the First Amendment.8 Although First Amendment
doctrine is superficially well established,9 there is deep disagreement over
the theories animating the First Amendment, the types of activities its
protections should cover, and the extent to which free speech liberties
should be balanced against other societal interests.10 Supreme Court
justices are explicitly accusing each other of “weaponizing” the First
Amendment to secure other political ends.11 Charges abound of the
cynical use of the First Amendment to circumvent economic regulation.
Scholars, disillusioned by the outcomes of free speech cases, are
questioning the most foundational, nonpartisan aspects of our critical free
speech protections.12 Many believe that free speech jurisprudence does
not serve society well, or does not even achieve the internal goals of the
First Amendment.13
The divisions underlying the First Amendment’s identity crisis have
manifested in a way that threatens even formerly uncontroversial aspects

8. Timothy Zick, Restroom Use, Civil Rights, and Free Speech “Opportunism,” 78 OHIO ST. L.J.
963, 998 (2017) (discussing the difficulty of criticizing “opportunistic” uses of the First Amendment when
“there is no agreed-upon consensus for what constitutes a proper use, as opposed to a misuse, of the Free
Speech Clause”); see also Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY
VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 174, 176 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone
eds., 2002) (arguing that the vaunted, “show stopper” nature of the First Amendment in American society
allows it to be used as a tool to accomplish goals unrelated to free speech).
9. See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 692 (discussing how describing free speech doctrine is
“superficially simple,” especially with respect to content-based restrictions on speech, but applying free
speech doctrine becomes more complex).
10. Zick, supra note 8, at 998 (remarking upon the “capacious language of the Free Speech Clause
and the inability of courts and scholars to produce a coherent theory or rule to cabin it”).
11. In her dissenting opinion in Janus v. AFSCME, Justice Elena Kagan claimed that the majority
opinion, which overturned mandatory public sector union dues as unconstitutional, “prevent[ed] the
American people, acting through their state and local officials, from making important choices about
workplace governance. . . . by weaponizing the First Amendment, in a way that unleashes judges, now
and in the future, to intervene in economic and regulatory policy.” 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan,
J., dissenting).
12. See Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian First Amendment,
118 COLUM. L. REV. 1953 (2018). Louis Michael Seidman persuasively argues that, despite scholars’
efforts, free speech cannot serve progressive goals without compromising the bedrock principles of
viewpoint neutrality and government nonfeasance, rendering free speech doctrine “unrecognizable as a
realization of First Amendment ideals.” Louis Michael Seidman, Can Free Speech Be Progressive?, 118
COLUM. L. REV. 2219, 2243, 2249 (2018) (“[Many progressives] just can't shake their mindless attraction
to the bright flame of our free speech tradition. Progressives need to turn away before they are burned
again.”).
13. Scholars have classified the First Amendment as “obsolete.” See Tim Wu, Is the First
Amendment Obsolete, 117 MICH. L. REV. 547, 548 (2018) (arguing that “there is reason to fear [the First
Amendment] is entering a new period of political irrelevance”). Others have questioned the central
premise
that
an
unfettered
marketplace
of
ideas
leads
to
truth.
See Brian
Leiter, The Case Against Free Speech, 38 SYDNEY L. REV. 407, 409 (2016) (“[M]ost non-mundane
speech people engage in is largely worthless, and the world be better off were it not expressed.”).
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of free speech doctrine.14 Differences between the egalitarian and
libertarian approaches to free speech doctrine have surfaced in the past,15
but now these disagreements have escalated to a point where different
factions may not be able to find much common ground—in both the
theory and application of free speech doctrine.
Accusations of political uses of the First Amendment may be
legitimate, or may be examples of second-order First Amendment
cynicism, reflecting the accuser’s own desire to use the First Amendment
to achieve other political ends unrelated to free speech. As an example,
the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), a long time champion of
robust free speech protections, is perceived by many, including former
members, as abandoning its principled stance in the service of other
political objectives.16 The ACLU has responded by explaining that in
choosing which cases to take, the organization must consider other
valuable social goals, like equality, but that its views of the doctrine
remain unchanged.17 It is unclear how many of the current accusations of
First Amendment cynicism are accurate and how many are overstated, or
worse, are intended to shape the First Amendment cynically—to serve
other political ends—as well.
Overstated concerns about “First Amendment Lochnerism”18 and
14. A recent Columbia Law Review Symposium was dedicated to “Free Expression in an Age of
Inequality.” According to the Symposium’s two contributors, those searching for a more “egalitarian First
Amendment,” who seek to combat “economic, racial, cultural, [and] constitutional” inequality will need
to undermine foundational doctrinal ideals such as viewpoint neutrality. Kessler & Pozen, supra note 12,
at 1954 (contending that those in favor of a more egalitarian First Amendment can achieve it best by
“putting pressure on First Amendment norms ranging from content and viewpoint neutrality to the
primacy of judicial enforcement to the baseline opposition to redistribution of expressive and
informational resources”).
15. After the Supreme Court’s controversial decision in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310
(2010), Kathleen Sullivan explained the apparent shift in robust support for free speech principles from
those on the political left to those on the political right as actually representing the tension between two
underling, contested visions of the First Amendment—free speech as political liberty versus free speech
as political equality. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143,
144–45 (2010). See also infra Part II.
16. See, e.g., Wendy Kaminer, The ACLU Retreats from Free Expression, WALL ST. J. June 20,
2019, at A17; Alan Dershowitz, The Final Nail in the ACLU’s Coffin, HILL (June 11, 2018)
www.thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/391682-the-final-nail-in-the-aclus-coffin; Erica Goldberg, An
Open
Letter
to
the
ACLU,
CROWDED
THEATER
(Mar.
21,
2018),
https://inacrowdedtheater.com/2018/03/21/an-open-letter-to-the-aclu-on-civil-liberties/.
17. After a guidelines memo that some believed contained new ACLU policies towards freedom
of expression, the ACLU’s Legal Director David Cole wrote a blog post to clarify the ACLU’s position.
See David Cole, The ACLU’s Longstanding Commitment to Defending Speech We Hate, ACLU (June 20,
2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/aclus-longstanding-commitment-defendingspeech-we-hate. For responses to the ACLU’s response to criticism, see Eugene Volokh, ACLU’s David
Cole Responds about ACLU and Freedom of Speech, REASON: VOLKOH CONSPIRACY (June 22, 2018,
9:46 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/06/22/aclus-david-cole-responds-about-aclu-and.
18. The infamous case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (overruled by Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963)), overturned a state statute limiting bakers to working 60 hours per week and
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weaponization by the courts, reductive media coverage,19 Internet culture,
heavy doses of academic legal realism,20 and compelling but overly
politicized accounts by political leaders, have infused excessive
pessimism into our perspective on the First Amendment.21 This
pessimism threatens all of our speech rights, because it leads to a vicious
cycle of unprincipled First Amendment jurisprudence. If someone
believes her political opponents are using the First Amendment cynically,
as a political tool, she may be more likely to resign herself to an
unprincipled First Amendment and advocate for cynical uses to serve her
own political ends. Her opponent will then observe this cynicism and be
more inclined to use the First Amendment cynically, continuing the
cycle.22 This cycle of cynicism is escalating between the political right
and left in their approaches to free speech.23
Scholars have devoted significant attention to the problems of
weaponization of the First Amendment, but there has not been an effort
to restore faith in a nonpartisan and apolitical First Amendment, and to
10 hours per day on substantive due process grounds. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 (finding “right to
contract’ trumped state maximum hours law). The case is now generally used as an example of judicial
overreach, especially in trying to control the economy and make purely political policy through
application of constitutional principles. For discussions of First Amendment Lochnerism, which draws an
analogy between free speech doctrine and the repudiated Lochner see, as examples, Mila Sohoni, The
Trump Administration and the Law of Lochner, 107 GEO. L.J. 1323, 1383–84 (2019); Jeremy K. Kessler,
The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915, 1917–18 & accompanying
notes (2018); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 135–36 and accompanying
notes (2016); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations
Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1233 (2014).
19. By this I mean both the media’s predominant fixation on the results of cases over their
reasoning, and also the media’s focus on hot-button issues. See infra Section I.C. for a discussion on how
the media may be exaggerating the campus free speech problem, or excluding other types of First
Amendment issues on college campuses.
20. Many academics simply do not believe the First Amendment can be applied in an apolitical
way. See, e.g., Seidman, supra note 12, at 2234 (discussing “the extent to which the speech game is
competitive and the extent to which doctrinal manipulation can support politically discriminatory
application of legal rules.”).
21. Popular portrayals of Supreme Court decisions by politicians generally infuse excessive
skepticism into society’s understanding of what Justices do, but this phenomenon is especially corrosive
in the First Amendment context. See, e.g., Erica Goldberg, We Must Restore Legitimacy to the Supreme
DISPATCH
(Oct.
31,
2018
5:00
a.m.),
Court,
COLUMBUS
https://www.dispatch.com/opinion/20181031/column-we-must-restore-legitimacy-to-us-supreme-court
(describing, as one example, President Obama’s criticism of Citizens United, where President Obama
“never mentioned the legal reasoning behind the Court’s decision -- overturning federal law that limited
money spent on supporting candidates prior to make documentaries, pamphlets and other media materials”
-- but “noted only the outcome he found unfavorable”).
22. This is just one mechanism by which a vicious cycle of First Amendment cynicism can occur.
Not every individual or organization will be equally affected by perceived First Amendment cynicism by
one’s opponents, but human psychology dictates that a collective loss of faith in the First Amendment
could have serious consequences. In Part I, I describe mechanisms that may be currently perpetuating this
cycle.
23. See infra Part I.
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discuss modifications to the doctrine that might further de-politicize the
doctrine. This article argues that a deeper understanding of the history of
First Amendment jurisprudence and its necessary implications
demonstrate that that the current concerns about First Amendment
Lochnerism by the right and First Amendment abandonment by the left,
while not frivolous, are overstated. Further, our longstanding civil
libertarian First Amendment tradition—with some limiting principles—
is the best way to keep free speech doctrine nonpartisan and apolitical,
restore the needed faith to keep the First Amendment legitimate, and
return the First Amendment to its rightful place as our most exceptional
and most vaunted constitutional right.
Finally, to prevent society’s faith in the First Amendment from
unraveling, new accords must be reached about the extent of the First
Amendment’s coverage, and new arguments must convince people that
the costs of free speech are worth its freedoms. This article develops
strategies for de-politicizing free speech cases, including managing the
docket to select for cases where egalitarian and libertarian approaches to
free speech overlap. It also provides arguments for convincing both
scholars and the public that strong free speech protections benefit society
far better than any alternative.24 This article applies these strategies to
current, difficult free speech scenarios, engaging particular aspects of free
speech doctrine.
Part I argues that claims of First Amendment cynicism are overstated,
particularly the charges against the right of First Amendment Lochnerism
and charges against the left of abandoning free speech. Part I also
demonstrates how the responses to perceived First Amendment cynicism
may become just as cynical as the problems they address. Part II then
disputes the notion that the First Amendment is inherently political. It
also explores why the currently dominant civil libertarian tradition is the
least cynical way to understand the First Amendment, but demonstrates

24. Those who believe that the First Amendment is valuable insofar as it serves social ends, such
as the production of truth or the safeguarding of democratic legitimacy, will need convincing that free
speech is serving its requisite instrumental goals. See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 690 (“Scholars who
espouse explicitly consequentialist theories of the First Amendment believe that free speech's value lies
in
advancing
particular
ends,
such
as
truth
or
democratic
selfgovernment. These free speech consequentialists argue that speech can and should be suppressed when a
given instance of speech actually works against those ends, or, more generally, when the benefits of
that speech are outweighed by other harms.”). Those who believe that free speech is an inherent right of
autonomous moral agents, such as those who have a deontological view of the First Amendment, id. at
691, will not need such convincing, although “threshold deontologists” will need to be convinced that free
speech rights do not cause harm above a certain threshold and thus overpowers our inherent rights. See
Carol Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death
Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751, 756 (2005) (explaining that to threshold deontologists, at “some
‘threshold’ of catastrophic consequences, categorical moral prohibitions should give way to
consequentialist concerns.”).
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where there is room for the “free speech as equality” approach.25 Later,
Part III offers ways of understanding the First Amendment that can depoliticize the doctrine without requiring judges to abandon vigorous
judicial review, and discusses approaches to free speech jurisprudence
that can be responsive to the poor and powerless without compromising
viewpoint neutrality. This article applies these insights to issues
surrounding the Supreme Court’s docket, corporate speech and economic
regulations generally, and hate speech, especially when promulgated by
white supremacists.
I. FOUNDATIONS AND INACCURACIES OF FIRST AMENDMENT CYNICISM
Restoring faith in the First Amendment requires a way out of the
current vicious cycle of First Amendment cynicism. This Part details and
then disputes the current charges of First Amendment cynicism. For the
purposes of this article, “First Amendment cynicism” is defined as the
purposeful creation or application of free speech doctrine to serve
political interests unrelated to freedom of expression. First Amendment
cynicism can take two forms: (1) using the First Amendment to
accomplish political goals unrelated to free speech that cannot be
accomplished through the legislature, and (2) denying application of the
First Amendment in order to promote interests unrelated to freedom of
expression. Although denying application of the First Amendment in
certain spheres may be perceived as simply balancing free speech rights
with other interests, this article characterizes this jurisprudential approach
to free speech as a cynical use in cases where those performing the
balancing consistently favor certain political or ideological interests that
match their political preferences.
The first section in this Part describes the nature of the accusations of
First Amendment cynicism against judges, scholars, and other individuals
who span the political and ideological spectra. The second section then
argues that these charges, while not frivolous, are overstated and ignore
the history and evolution of First Amendment jurisprudence. Indeed,
some of these charges may reflect second-order First Amendment
cynicism, where accusations of First Amendment cynicism are
themselves intended to serve political ends unrelated to freedom of
expression.26
25. Kathleen Sullivan develops the often-competing “free speech as liberty” and “free speech as
equality” approaches to the First Amendment in an essay that explores the polarizing response to Citizens
United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). See Sullivan, supra note 15, at 144–45.
26. There is an infinite regress problem, because accusations of second-order First Amendment
cynicism may themselves be intended to shape First Amendment doctrine or culture cynically.
Demonstrably false accusations of second-order First Amendment cynicism may be termed third-order
First Amendment cynicism—one who vehemently disagrees with this article may label it as an example
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A. First Amendment Lochnerism and Weaponization by the Right
Judges and commentators across the political spectrum are
precipitously losing faith that their political opponents value a
nonpartisan First Amendment. Although some critical legal scholars have
lamented for decades that free speech doctrine cannot be ideologically
neutral,27 recently, more pointed charges have emerged. For example,
accusations by the political left about the political right, which detail the
“Lochnerization”28or weaponization of the First Amendment to benefit
specific classes of people or political interests, are increasingly part of the
mainstream discourse surrounding current free speech doctrine.
Older versions of progressive critiques of America’s highly protective
free speech jurisprudence targeted more high-level, philosophical
approaches to the doctrine and the implications of those approaches.
These critiques were more abstract and less personal than the current
charges of First Amendment cynicism. In the 1990s, for example, Jack
Balkin provided a compelling explanation for the First Amendment “sea
change,” where those on the left had begun to abandon their traditionally
fervent support of a libertarian conception of free speech rights.29 He
analogized the legal realist movement of the 1920s and 1930s, which
portrayed freedom of contract as not truly “free” due to background
economic conditions, to a new legal realism targeting when free speech is
meaningful as a right.30 According to Balkin, those on the left have
advanced significant arguments that background social and economic
inequalities deprive certain underprivileged classes of people from having
equal opportunities to speak, even if First Amendment doctrine is
formally “free.”31
of third- or even fourth-order First Amendment cynicism. This article will not embark on a discussion of
the infinite orders of First Amendment cynicism given how few empirical examples we have of this
phenomenon, but the infinite possibilities for First Amendment cynicism demonstrates why it is
imperative to develop ways of exiting the vicious cycle of First Amendment cynicism.
27. Neutrality is, of course, a difficult and contested concept, and the critical legal movement was
dedicated to the view that the law can never be neutral. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State
Can Promote Moral Ideals After All, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1350, 1350-52 (1991) (relating how critiques of
the liberal concept of neutrality “argue that the liberal state is not neutral at all, but rather uses the rhetoric
of neutrality to promote, legitimate, and defend a way of life that is built upon class, sex, and race
inequality”). At a high level of abstraction, the application of legal principles must be considered political
in that one has to accept our current legal structure and order. At the level of First Amendment doctrine,
however, I seek to demonstrate that free speech principles can be, at least theoretically, both nonpartisan
and apolitical. See infra Part II.
28. See Shanor, supra note 18; infra Section I.C.
29. See Jack M. Balkin, Some Realism about Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 376 (1990).
30. Id. at 379–80.
31. Id. at 380–82 (detailing the feminist argument that “[j]ust as the exchange between employer
and employee looks free but is actually coerced, so the speech of women and of other groups is not free
but is actually the result of social forces beyond their control”).
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These more abstract, philosophical critiques of the meaning, scope, and
application of free speech doctrine have ripened into something more
sinister, as both the left and the right are, with mounting vitriol, accusing
each other of purposely manipulating and misapplying First Amendment
doctrine to serve political ends.
Scholars, usually on the political or ideological left, have marshaled
arguments that the First Amendment, which was supposed to benefit
those with minority viewpoints and the relatively politically powerless,
has been co-opted to serve corporate interests. First Amendment scholar
Amanda Shanor, for example, argues that corporations have successfully
deployed a litigating strategy to render the First Amendment more
receptive to commercial interests.32 These developments, which Shanor
finds regrettable, were in part effectuated by “well-organized business
actors and conservative movement lawyers acting in a multifaceted
approach over decades to influence the meaning and constitutional
salience of free speech protections.”33
According to Shanor, the commercial speech doctrine, of relatively
recent advent, was originally “forged as a tool of consumer protection to
secure the value of commercial speech to society, not to ensure the
autonomy interests of commercial speakers.” However, the doctrine has
expanded to encompass a speaker-based right of businesses.34 In some
courts of appeals, corporations may even be able to fight the compulsion
of commercial speech as if it were akin to the suppression of commercial
speech.35
Especially during a time where “soft” regulation happens
mostly through mechanisms that resemble compelled speech, such as
disclosure requirements, the expansive “commercial speech doctrine”
allows corporations to exploit free speech protections to serve as a
powerful “deregulatory engine.”36 In essence, the doctrine has been
perverted from its original purpose and scope, and corporations are
partially to blame.
More broadly, many scholars believe that the First Amendment, instead
of being used a metaphorical shield to defend against censorship, is being
32. See Shanor, supra note 18, at 135 (“[A] largely business-led social movement has mobilized
to embed libertarian-leaning understandings of the First Amendment in constitutional jurisprudence.”).
33. Id. at 163.
34. Id. at 150–51.
35. Id. at 145–52 (“Commercial plaintiffs have mounted cases against economic regulations
ranging from the more quotidian -- such as tour guide licensing, required country-of-origin labels on meat
products, and a prohibition on the sale of guns at a county fair -- to laws implicating weightier matters
such as public health and foreign affairs -- including the Food and Drug Administration's graphic cigarette
warnings, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act's ban on the off-label promotion of drugs, and the Securities
and Exchange Commission’s required reporting of whether a company's products contain minerals
sourced from the armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo.”).
36. Id. at 134. Shanor’s article traces the development of commercial speech doctrine to explain
its current clash with the administrative state. Id. at 137.
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used as a sword to strike down all manner of progressive regulation in
favor of more conservative approaches to economic and social policy.37
Attorney and scholar Morgan Weiland chronicles how the expansion of
speech rights have produced a new First Amendment theory that she calls
“thin autonomy,” which is contrary to the traditional liberal and
republican conceptions of free speech.38 According to Weiland, the
liberal conception of free speech, which emphasizes personal autonomy
for individuals,39 and the republican conception of free speech, which
focuses on how First Amendment protections can serve the democracy
and public good,40 have been subordinated to a libertarian understanding
of the free speech right that is simply a “naked right against the state.”41
Giving free speech rights to corporations does not serve individual
autonomy, because corporations do not have individual autonomy
interests, nor does it benefit the public at large.
Even Supreme Court Justices have begun to make pointed accusations
about the perversion of First Amendment doctrine. For example, in Janus
v. ACSFME,42 the majority overturned precedent to hold that public sector
unions cannot constitutionally require non-union members to contribute
agency fees to support a union’s collective bargaining activities, because
agency fees mandate the compelled subsidization of private speech on
matters of public concern.43 Justice Kagan, in dissent, accused the
Justices in the majority of demeaning the majesty of the First Amendment
in order to use it to suit their own political preferences—in this case,
defunding public sector unions. Powerfully, Justice Kagan excoriated the
majority’s dismissal of longstanding precedent and disruption of workers’
ability to organize.44
There is no sugarcoating today’s opinion. The majority overthrows a
decision entrenched in this Nation’s law—and in its economic life—for
over 40 years. As a result, it prevents the American people, acting through
their state and local officials, from making important choices about
workplace governance. And it does so by weaponizing the First
Amendment, in a way that unleashes judges, now and in the future, to

37. According to Justice Kagan’s dissent in Janus v. ACFSME, “the majority has chosen the
winners by turning the First Amendment into a sword, and using it against workaday economic and
regulatory policy.” 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
38. Morgan N. Weiland, Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant
Libertarian Speech Tradition, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1396–97 (2007).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1395.
41. Id. at 1397.
42. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
43. Id. at 2464.
44. Id. at 2501 (Kagain, J., dissenting).
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intervene in economic and regulatory policy.45

Previously, in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Justice Breyer also compared an
expansive First Amendment ruling with deregulatory implications to
Lochner v. New York, an “anticanonical”46 case considered to be an
example of judicial overreach in inventing constitutional rights in order
to judicially mandate economic policy.47 Sorrell invalidated, on First
Amendment grounds, a state law restricting the sale and disclosure of
doctors’ prescribing practices.48
Of course, Justices throughout history have accused each other of
ignoring the Constitution in favor of their own policy preferences,
including in First Amendment cases. The dissent even did so in the muchcelebrated West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,49 which
held that public school students cannot be forced to salute the flag.50 But
recent attacks, by both Supreme Court Justices, scholars, and members of
society, are particularly powerful due to their pointedness and due to our
current state of political polarization.51 The judiciary generally, including
the confirmations process, has become far more polarized.52 Because free
speech requires buy-in about its principled application, and because our
society is currently so polarized, these accusations of First Amendment
cynicism have become political in a way that could undermine First
Amendment rights.
B. Left-Leaning Disrespect For and Cynical Approach to Free Speech
As the political right expands free speech in ways the left finds cynical,
the right has accused the left of attempting to undo or reshape free speech
45. Id.
46. See Jamal Greene, The Anticannon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380–81 (2011) (including Lochner
v. New York in the anticannon, a set of decisions that are universally agreed upon as the worst Supreme
Court cases with the most indefensible central premises).
47. Id. at 418–19 (“It is error, on this view, for judges to invalidate democratically enacted statutes
based on their subjective moral or political preferences rather than on the values authoritatively codified
in the Constitution.”).
48. 564 U.S. 552, 585 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Central Hudson v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
49. 319 U.S. 624, 665-66 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 642. See also Erica Goldberg, “Good Orthodoxy” and the Legacy Of Barnette, 13 FIU
L. REV. 639, 642 (2019) (discussing how the dissent accused the majority of using the Constitution to
enact its policy preferences).
51. See Jack Balkin, The Recent Unpleasantness: Understanding the Cycles of Constitutional
Time, 94 IND. L.J. 253, 258 (2019) (describing and citing studies to demonstrate why our current political
and constitutional moment is one of “peak polarization”).
52. See Richard L. Hansen, Polarization and the Judiciary, 22 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 261 (2019)
(arguing that increasing polarization of the citizenry has led to an increasingly polarized judicial selection
process, increasing polarization of judicial decision-making, and an increasing partisanship to the public’s
assessment of judges and judicial opinions).
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protections in ways that appear extreme and polarized, or, at least, selfserving. The accusation from the right is that those on the left, often
academics or university students more so than judges, either wish to
weaponize the First Amendment to serve progressive causes or seek to
stop its obvious and fair application to serve their own causes.
Indeed, the Columbia Law Review recently hosted a symposium on
how free speech can better combat inequality. The symposium’s scholars
tackled the inequalities created by the current “‘Lochnerian’ turn in First
Amendment doctrine.”53 However, this type of symposium also
contributes to a view, among many on the right, that those on the political
or ideological left advocate for cynical uses of the First Amendment.
Instead of caring about a principled application of free speech doctrine,
these scholars wish to use free speech doctrine as a means to facilitate
progress on their pet issue—inequality, defined with a particularly leftleaning valence. Indeed, the Introduction offers, as an alternative to First
Amendment Locherism, “a First Amendment that would advance, rather
than obstruct or remain indifferent to, the pursuit of social and economic
equality.”
The symposium explored ideas regarding both about how to craft more
robust First Amendment doctrine to serve particular causes,54 and how to
ensure the First Amendment doesn’t reach sectors these scholars desire to
regulate.55 This project does not necessarily reflect First Amendment
cynicism if the scholars genuinely believe that the First Amendment’s
proper scope should be limited or expanded in this way based on doctrinal
coherence, text, history, or free speech policy. Perhaps the project also
does not reflect First Amendment cynicism if the authors simply wish to
negate what they perceive as free speech overreach in a way that tends to
increase economic and social inequality.
However, the scholars’ primary interests often appear to be
affirmatively advancing political and social justice aims, and free speech
doctrine often seems a mere means to those aims. That approach does fit
into the category of First Amendment cynicism. Of course, equality as
the goal of a legal system is a broader, more justifiable, and less political
aim than, for example, defunding unions or economic de-regulation. But
53. Symposium, A First Amendment for All: Free Expression in an Age of Inequality, 118 COLUM.
L. REV. i (2018) (defining “‘Lochnerian’ turn” as “the use of the First Amendment to entrench social and
economic hierarchy.”).
54. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk, A Progressive Labor Vision of the First Amendment: Past as
Prologue, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2057, 2076 (2018) (arguing in favor of expanding First Amendment
doctrine substantially to cover labor picketing and boycotts).
55. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech Is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011, 2032-33
(2018) (arguing that the First Amendment should not prevent regulation of social media platforms in order
to increase consumers “practical freedom” at the expense of concentrated media companies’ potential free
speech rights).
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the types of equality discussed, and discussed as a broad grouping, reflect
a progressive ideology of equality of outcome instead of equality of
opportunity, and favor certain types of equality over liberty, reflecting
views at the left of center on the political spectrum.
Other accusations from the right are that, in less sophisticated ways
than their professor counterparts, some vocal university students chant
their disrespect for free speech or aim to shut down speech when speakers
with objectionable views come to their campuses.56 Shouting down or
disrupting speakers is not a problem unique to the political left, but some
on the left with progressive views have come to perceive the First
Amendment as so antithetical to progressive causes such as equality
(which they may care more about than free speech) that they are willing
to abandon the idea of a principled First Amendment, which serves even
objectionable speech, altogether. Even at law schools, where free, open,
and civil debate is a necessity for a well-rounded academic education in
the legal profession, students have shut down mainstream conservative
speakers for espousing views, even views about free speech, which they
find objectionable.57 Many on the political right believe that the left has
abandoned free speech, cynically, in favor of their own pet political
causes, but then wish to benefit from free speech when it suits their own
political interests.
Perhaps the left has polarized against the right’s actual or perceived
misuses of the First Amendment. Free speech may be used as a pretext
for white supremacy. Indeed, the organizer of the white supremacist
Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, who claimed to be a champion of
free speech values, sued a woman for swearing at him.58 In the minds of
many on the left, unfortunately, free speech as a pretext for upholding
racist values has been solidified.
As a result of this dynamic, many believe that the left is also now
contributing to First Amendment cynicism in a way that produces greater
polarity between both sides of the political spectrum. The ACLU, famous
56. See Stanley Kurtz, Year of the Shout Down: It Was Worse Than You Think, NAT’L REV.(May
31, 2017 1:48 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/year-shout-down-worse-you-think-campusfree-speech/. For a description of the destructive protests at the University of California, Berkeley, see
Erica Goldberg, Competing Free Speech Values in an Age of Protest, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2163, 2165–
66 (2018) (“One of the justifications for the violent protest in response to the University of California,
Berkeley's hosting of alt-right speaker Milo Yiannopoulos was that his speech is so threatening and
silencing to minority groups that their only recourse is to respond with violence.”).
57. See Scott Jaschik, Shutting Down Talk on Campus Free Speech, INSIDE HIGHER ED (April 16,
2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/04/16/guest-lecture-free-speech-cuny-law-schoolheckled (reporting and linking to video where students at CUNY Law School chanted over Professor Josh
Blackman’s guest lecture on free speech).
58. Matt Novak, Judge Awards $5 to Free Speech Rally Organizer Because a Woman Cursed at
Him, GIZMODO (July 2, 2018), https://gizmodo.com/judge-awards-5-to-free-speech-rally-organizerbecause-1827280858.
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for representing clients like neo-Nazis who wished to march in Skokie,
Illinois, a town populated by many Holocaust survivors, is rethinking its
approach to so-called “hate speech” cases.59 The Skokie case “has come
to symbolize the ACLU's nonpartisan, evenhanded defense
of constitutional rights,”60 but the ACLU has changed its stance with
respect to armed protesters who represent hate groups.61 A leaked internal
memo by ACLU staff members outlines the factors the ACLU will use
when deciding whether to take a case, including
the (present and historical) context of the proposed speech; the potential
effect on marginalized communities; the extent to which the speech may
assist in advancing the goals of white supremacists or others whose views
are contrary to our values; and the structural and power inequalities in the
community in which the speech will occur.62

These changed approaches may simply reflect the more dangerous nature
of certain types of protesters, but the ACLU, which now champions
causes that seem more politically left-leaning and are unrelated to the
classic understanding of “liberty,” must balance other interests against a
principled defense of free speech.63
These accusations of left-leaning First Amendment cynicism are
serious, but, as described in the next section, they are also overstated,
which may have even more serious consequences.
C. Allegations of First Amendment Cynicism Are Overstated and
Ahistorical
An important first step in combating actual First Amendment cynicism
is demonstrating that perceptions of First Amendment cynicism are
overstated. The left’s and the right’s visions of free speech diverge, but
not as sharply or as crassly as critics contend. Many of the loci of
disagreement involve issues where reasonable minds can differ. Further,
although the form of the accusations has become more pointed, charges
59. See Dara Lind, Why the ACLU Is Adjusting Its Approach to Free Speech After Charlottesville,
VOX (Aug. 21, 2017, 10:06 AM), https://www.vox.com/2017/8/20/16167870/aclu-hate-speech-nazischarlottesville (describing how “[t]he ACLU seemed like it was in the midst of a partial reinvention as an
explicitly progressive organization for the Donald Trump era”).
60. David Cole, Are You Now or Have you Ever Been a Member of the ACLU, 90 MICH. L. REV.
1404, 1417 (1992).
61. After the deadly rally in Charlottesville, where a white supremacist attending to rally killed
protester Heather Heyer, the ACLU’s President Anthony Romero issued a statement that the ACLU would
no longer defend the free speech rights of those who wish to march carrying firearms. Lind, supra note
59.
62. See Robby Soave, Leaked Internal Memo Reveals ACLU is Wavering on Free Speech, REASON
(June 23, 2018 8:25 AM), https://reason.com/blog/2018/06/21/aclu-leaked-memo-free-speech.
63. See Goldberg, supra note 16 (arguing that the ACLU is abandoning its traditional protection
of civil liberties in favor of supporting various civil rights causes).
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of First Amendment Lochnerism are not new. The connection between
free speech rights and economic deregulation has a long pedigree and may
be inseverable. In addition, many of the doctrines the left now criticizes
originated from liberal jurists, demonstrating the political malleability—
a feature, not a bug—of the First Amendment. Many on both the left and
the right continue to advance arguments in favor of a principled free
speech jurisprudence without regard to the content of speech or the
political result of protecting particular speech. Finally, some of the
accusations against both the right and the left for First Amendment
cynicism may reflect second-order First Amendment cynicism, to the
extent they are either demonstrably false or are intended pretextually to
achieve political ends unrelated to freedom of expression.
1. The Left’s and Right’s Principled Divergences
Much of the difference between the right’s and the left’s approach to
free speech reflects two different visions of the First Amendment, one
where free speech serves political equality and one where free speech
serves political liberty.64 As constitutional law expert Kathleen Sullivan
articulates, in the “free speech as equality” conception, marginalized
groups deserve extra solicitude from the government, which cannot
discriminate when subsidizing speech or allowing speech on public
land.65 However, wealthy corporations deserve no special treatment.66
In the “free speech as liberty” conception, the First Amendment serves to
prevent governmental tyranny, or the suppression of speech based on the
state’s sense of what is good instead of the “private ordering of ideas.”67
In many cases, these two conceptions overlap,68 leading to wide victories
for litigants claiming First Amendment protections.69
By contrast, Citizens United v FEC,70 a case that sharply divided
conservatives and liberals both on and off the Court,71 reflects the
64. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 144–45.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 145.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 144 n.9 (discussing classes of cases where the “free speech as equality” and “free speech
as liberty” concepts align).
69. See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017) (invalidating provisions of the Lanham Act
forbidding the trademarking of disparaging terms); Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017)
(overturning conviction based on law that banned sex offenders from access to particular types of social
media); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (overturning damages award for intentional infliction of
emotional distress based on protest of military funeral by controversial religious group); United States v.
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (invalidating ban on depictions of animal cruelty).
70. 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (invalidating federal law restricting expenditures on political campaignrelated speech by corporations, including non-profit corporation that produced the documentary at issue).
71. The Court’s 5-4 decision did not fall entirely on partisan lines, as dissenter Justice Stevens was
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differences in these two approaches, despite the fact that Justices in both
the majority and the dissent embraced both of these visions, in some
form.72 Ultimately, the majority in Citizens United believed antithetical
to the First Amendment the “affirmative action for marginal speech”73
notions underlying the alternative approach. The necessary result of the
antidistortion rationale espoused by Justice Stevens’ partial concurrence
and dissent is that powerful speakers such as corporations, can be silenced
to make room for other voices.74 Justice Kennedy’s majority found this
at intractable odds with First Amendment jurisprudence.75 Further,
Justice Kennedy’s majority and Justice Stevens’s partial concurrence and
dissent disagreed on whether there was a compelling need to restrict
campaign expenditures.76 Reasonable minds can disagree on which
approach is more consistent with First Amendment theory and
jurisprudence, and whether prohibiting campaign expenditures is
necessary to mitigate political corruption. The next Part discusses why
free speech as liberty is more consistent with a nonpartisan First
Amendment, but it suffices here to note that both the majority and the
dissent articulated coherent views of freedom of speech, despite the later
politicization of the case.77
Of course, any given Justice, scholar, or member of society may select
his or her abstract approach to free speech doctrine—either free speech as
liberty or free speech as equality—based on how that approach will affect
preferred outcomes. That may be what happened in Janus v. AFSCME,78
where Court split entirely on partisan lines, and the majority invalidated

appointed by Gerald Ford. However, Justice Stevens is considered to be a judicial liberal. See Matthew
Sag et al., Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property: An Empirical Study, 97 CAL. L. REV.
801, 831 (2009) (“Justice Stevens was appointed by President Ford, but is now the most liberal member
of the Supreme Court.”). The author agrees with Kathleen Sullivan that “[w]hile the labels ‘liberal’ and
‘conservative’ are reductive and sometimes incoherent as descriptions of the Justices’ approaches to
constitutional decisionmaking, they have become pervasive in popular accounts of the Court and in
attempts to quantify its outcomes”). Sullivan, supra note 15, at 144 n.7.
72. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 145 (“Neither vision, however, entirely eclipses the other in Citizens
United; each of the principal opinions pays lip service to the other by invoking the other's theory in its
own cause.”).
73. Id.
74. According to the majority, “[i]f the antidistortion rationale were to be accepted, however, it
would permit Government to ban political speech simply because the speaker is an association that has
taken on the corporate form.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310, 349 (2010).
75. Id.
76. Compare id. at 357 (“Limits on independent expenditures, such as § 441b, have a chilling
effect extending well beyond the Government's interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption. The
anticorruption interest is not sufficient to displace the speech here in question.”) with id. at 442 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (discussing “the need to confront the distinctive corrupting potential of corporate electoral
advocacy financed by general treasury dollars”).
77. See Sullivan, supra note 15.
78. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
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mandatory public sector union dues as impermissible compelled speech.79
Results-driven reasoning is a risk in all aspects of constitutional law, and
all law in general. We should be vigilant to ensure Justices do not proffer
pretextual opinions, and we should establish a constitutional culture
where judges feel obligated to explain their theories of jurisprudence in
broader terms to demonstrate their internal coherence and fidelity to the
rule of law. However, currently, we can test Justices and commentators
only on the coherence of their approaches and the consistency in
application of those approaches. Justice Kagan’s claim that the First
Amendment was “weaponiz[ed]” in Janus,80 for example, should require
a much greater indication that the Justices have departed from either their
views of stare decisis (as Janus overruled a portion of Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education)81 or a greater indication that Janus is inconsistent
with the majority’s approach to First Amendment law more generally.
Although Justice Kagan, in the Janus dissent, claimed that “[t]he First
Amendment was meant for better things,”82 the majority, explicitly, at
least, believed it was vindicating an important principle, encapsulated in
a quote by Thomas Jefferson, that “to compel a man to furnish
contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves and abhor[s] is sinful and tyrannical.”83 Justice Kagan has a
notion of democracy, much like free speech as equality, in which the state
can intervene to allow citizens to more effectively access democratic
institutions.84 Justice Alito’s view aligns with the free speech as liberty
approach. Plus, like in Citizens United, Janus itself may boil down to a
fight over compelling interest analysis. The majority thought free rider
problems, where individuals can be represented by unions without paying
dues were not a sufficient compelling interest,85 whereas Justice Kagan’s
dissent believed the government was justified in believing that “agency
fees are necessary for exclusive representation to work.”86 Although it is
convenient that perhaps all of the Janus Justices’ compelling-interest
analysis aligns with their political views, those views may have colored
what was already a reasonable approach instead of directing the Justices
to a disingenuous or unreasonable interpretation of the Constitution.
Other disagreements that appear to manifest First Amendment
79. Id. at 2486–87.
80. Id. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
81. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
82. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2502 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 2464 (majority opinion) (quoting A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 2 Papers
of Thomas Jefferson 545 (J. Boyd ed. 1950) (emphasis omitted and footnote omitted)).
84. Id. at 2502 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the First Amendment “was meant not to
undermine but to protect democratic governance—including over the role of public-sector unions”).
85. Id. at 2466 (majority opinion).
86. Id. at 2490 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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cynicism may also reflect underlying doctrinal differences that are not
entirely political in nature. The right and the left also sometimes disagree
about whether restrictions on speech should be considered equally
problematic as compelled speech. According to Justice Alito’s majority
opinion in Janus, compelling speech is worse than restricting speech
because in addition to interfering with the private marketplace of ideas,
“individuals are coerced into betraying their convictions.”87 This
divergence on how to treat compelled speech has recently arisen in
commercial speech cases involving mandatory disclosure provisions,
because many believe disclosure requirements on corporations are benign
and simply add information to the actual marketplace.88
There is a significant argument that doctrines affording commercial
speech First Amendment protections, originally developed by liberal
jurists to vindicate listeners’ rights, have been perverted to benefit
corporate interests.89 But the very fact that the current protections for
corporations evolved from the commercial speech doctrine, “as one facet
of a progressively led rights revolution”90 aimed at consumer protection,91
demonstrates how apolitical the First Amendment still is, can be, and
should be.92 Although it is true that listener’s rights have, to some degree,
merged with the free speech rights of corporate speakers,93 this is not
necessarily an indication of First Amendment cynicism. Protecting the
ability of the corporation to speak also protects against governmental
ordering of what the listener may hear, consistent with the free speech as
liberty vision, even if not with the free speech as equality vision.
Some scholars see cases like Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,94 which
invalidated a state law restricting the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy
87. Id. at 2464 (majority opinion).
88. Shanor, supra note 18, at 152–53 (contending that although the Supreme Court treats
compelled commercial speech as a lesser constitutional problem than restrictions on commercial speech,
“some circuit court decisions have not been so clear”).
89. Weiland, supra note 38, at 1433 (“[B]ecause corporate speech rights are clearly vindicated by
the Court’s deregulatory move [in Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 773 (1976)], while it is not at all clear whether listeners' rights are similarly upheld, the Court
arguably began to use listeners' rights as an instrumental one-way deregulatory ratchet.”).
90. Shanor, supra note 18, at 142.
91. Id. at 143 (“The commercial speech doctrine was forged as a tool of consumer protection to
secure the value of commercial speech to society, not to ensure the autonomy interests of commercial
speakers.”).
92. Id. (“The doctrinal revolution in commercial speech came over the strenuous opposition of the
Court's conservatives.”).
93. According to Weiland, in commercial speech cases, “the Court radically transformed listeners’
rights from how they are understood in the republican tradition, reconceptualizing listeners as individuals
with an interest in the ‘free flow of information.’ It purported to vindicate those rights through
deregulatory rulings, the same mechanism that benefits corporate speech rights.” Weiland, supra note 38,
at 1430.
94. 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
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records on the prescribing practices of doctors without their consent,95 as
expanding protections for commercial speech too far.96 But the case also
shows that the First Amendment benefits speakers and listeners regardless
of identity, and no one political approach can win under the First
Amendment. The view that corporations should not be discriminated
against as one type of speaker, a view that divided the left and the right in
Citizens United v. FEC, is eminently justifiable, even if debatable.
2. The Historical Interaction of Free Speech Rights and Economic
Liberties
As detailed in the previous subsection, interpretations by scholars and
jurists on the right and left often reflect principled disagreements about
the nature of the free speech right. In addition, there is far more political
fluidity in the doctrine than can be captured in simple left/right
dichotomies.
As historian and legal scholar Jeremy Kessler
comprehensively chronicles, free speech liberties and economic deregulation have long been intertwined,97 often based on the jurisprudence
of liberal Supreme Court Justices.
Originally, media companies fought for free speech rights to publish
objectionable content and fought against licensing taxes.98 Many of the
earliest victories for free speech were won by newspapers, often
represented by “corporate lawyers tasked with fending off New Deal
economic regulation,” and specifically a trade group controlled by
newspaper chains.99 In Near v. Minnesota, for example, the Court held
that despite a newspaper’s operating as a business, which could be viewed
as conduct instead of speech, the press has a right against prior restraint
to publish information about corrupt public officials, even if it might have
previously published scandalous or defamatory information.100 In

95. Id. at 563–64 (holding that Vermont’s law imposed impermissible content- and speaker- based
restrictions on speech).
96. According to Shanor, because the commercial speech doctrine was intended to give some, but
lesser, protection to commercial speech, restrictions on commercial speech are necessarily content based.
Shanor, supra note 18, at 151. The Court missteps, then, when it strikes down regulations on commercial
speech because they are content based. Id.
97. Kessler, supra note 18, at 1925 (“While certainly not the dominant trend in First Amendment
jurisprudence, judicial suspicion of economic regulations that incidentally restrict the exercise of First
Amendment rights-- even when that exercise takes the form of commercial activity--has a long doctrinal
pedigree . . . .”).
98. Id. at 1925–26.
99. Id. at 1925.
100. 283 U.S. 697, 720 (1931) (“In attempted justification of the statute, it is said that it deals not
with publication per se, but with the ‘business' of publishing defamation. If, however, the publisher has a
constitutional right to publish, without previous restraint, an edition of his newspaper charging official
derelictions, it cannot be denied that he may publish subsequent editions for the same purpose.”).
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Grosjean v. American Press Co., the Court held that taxes on newspapers
with high circulations violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.101
The Supreme Court recognized that the power to tax, or interfere with the
running of a business, could have dramatic First Amendment
implications.
Then, furthering the connection between civil and economic liberties,
the “peddling tax” cases invalidated laws requiring taxes on the
distribution and sale of Jehovah’s Witnesses’ religious literature, despite
the fact that the taxes applied to commerce generally.102 Jurists began to
notice a “basic, structural antagonism between judicial civil
libertarianism and judicial deference to political regulation of the
economy.”103 Part of the tension was created by the famous Carolene
Products Footnote Four, which gave special status to enumerated
constitutional rights, as above economic regulation.104 “Successful
attempts to shore up the logic of bifurcated review—to formulate a
workable distinction between judicial defense of civil liberty and judicial
supervision of the economy—have been few and far between in the courts
and in the academy.”105 Even many liberal “Justices rather saw a free
market in particular goods and services (the sale of religious magazines,
the advertisement of abortion services) as inextricable from the free
market in self-expression and self-determination that they sought to
vindicate.”106
Thus, according to Kessler, scholars today have an unduly narrow
sense of First Amendment Lochnerism, which has a long history that is
far more politically complex and broader than the narrative of
conservative Justices wishing to strike down economic regulations to
benefit corporate interests.107 Kessler’s presentation of this history of the
First Amendment is not intended to justify the state of the doctrine.
Instead, he believes that those seeking First Amendment reforms will
have to challenge wider swaths of the doctrine and resort to legislative
solutions to gain political control of the economy.108 The entanglement
101. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
102. Kessler, supra note 18, at 1957–59.
103. Id. at 1976.
104. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (“There may be narrower scope
for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed
equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. “); see also Kessler, supra note 18, at
1919 (discussing the danger of Carolene Products Footnote 4 to economic regulations).
105. Kessler, supra note 18, at 2003–04.
106. Id. at 2000.
107. Id. at 2000 (“This definition of Lochnerism . . . adopted by many contemporary critics of First
Amendment Lochnerism, has worked to obscure the long-term, economically libertarian tendencies of
aggressive judicial enforcement of the First Amendment.”).
108. Id.
at
2003
(“In
light
of
this
longer
history,
critics
of
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of free speech rights and economic liberties is well entrenched in the
doctrine, often perpetuated by “liberal judges as activists.”109
3. First Amendment Lochnerism Forever
Indeed, even the term “First Amendment Lochnerism” has been around
for quite some time. This analogy, which is usually, although not
always,110 meant to reproach, has been invoked in a variety of contexts,
not all dealing with instances where constitutional rights trump economic
restrictions. Donald Livey chided the Court’s entire First Amendment
scheme of protecting only certain speech as embracing “a first
amendment variant of Lochnerism” in the 1980s.111 This early accusation
of First Amendment Lochnerism contended that the Court protects speech
based on its own policy preferences; for example, it excludes obscenity
and fighting words from free speech protections based on its own
subjective conception of value.112
First Amendment Lochnerism was also discussed in relation to the
Court’s protection of hate speech in the 1990s, and the Court’s blurring
of the line between speech and conduct.113 Other scholars have invoked
the term when discussing specific cases, such as a case invalidating
criminal sanctions for those who publish intercepted communications
between union members,114 or the case involving burning of draft cards,
which established the expressive conduct paradigm,115 where expressive
conduct receives some First Amendment scrutiny but more easily passes
constitutional review than pure speech.116 The current charges of First
contemporary First Amendment Lochnerism might be wise to abandon their defense of an illusory
tradition of economically neutral First Amendment enforcement. Instead, they could take up the banner
of radical reform and seek to break with a legal tradition that has long been insensitive to the tension
between judicial civil libertarianism and judicial deference to economic regulation.”).
109. Id. at 2001–02.
110. For an article criticizing the use of the term as strictly a pejorative, see Howard Wasserman,
Bartnicki as Lochner: Some Thoughts on First Amendment Lochnerism, 33 N. KY. L. REV.421, 423 (2006)
(“The pejorative nature of the term ultimately serves to obscure meaningful substantive constitutional
dialogue about the meaning of the freedom of speech and how that freedom should be balanced against
competing constitutional, political, and social values.”).
111. Donald E. Livey, The Sometimes Relevant First Amendment, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 881, 883 (1987).
112. Id. at 884–85.
113. Morton J. Horwitz, The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without
Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 110–15 (1993).
114. Wasserman, supra note 110, at 423 (comparing Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 519 (2001) with
Lochner).
115. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 771
(2001) (comparing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), with Lochner).
116. According to the Court, expressive conduct, like the burning of a draft card, involves elements
of speech and non-speech. Unlike restrictions on pure speech, which receive strict scrutiny, restrictions
on expressive conduct receive intermediate scrutiny. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (“[A]
government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
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Amendment Lochnerism, which are more pointed and repeated in greater
stereo, may simply be another wave of criticisms of the interpretation of
an amendment that does not give great guidance to courts and will
necessarily create discord in its application. Thus, the perception of First
Amendment cynicism may be stronger among the current public, but that
does not necessarily reflect historical reality of actual or perceived
instances of First Amendment cynicism.
4. Misrepresenting the Left’s Abandonment of Free Speech
The previous subparts mainly refute the accusations, made by the left
against the right, of First Amendment cynicism that takes the forms of
First Amendment Lochnerism and weaponization of free speech doctrine.
There is also good reason to believe that the accusations by the right
against the left, largely in the form that the left has abandoned a robust,
principled reading of the First Amendment, are overstated, and may
themselves reflect second-order First Amendment cynicism.117
Undermining accusations of First Amendment cynicism from the right
about the left, many university students and progressives still strongly
believe in free speech, but simply want to devote their energy to other
causes or to acknowledge those hurt by speech.118 Those who wish to
heckle speakers appear to simply be a vocal, and virulent, minority.119
There is some evidence that the “campus free speech crisis” is
improving.120 Plus, many who appear to have abandoned a viewpointneutral, robust free speech regime offer views about free speech that echo
the older legal realist critiques of the 1990s, although those critiques have
morphed and become less sophisticated once they entered the realm of
general public discourse.
Further, there is some evidence that those on the right, who are quite
dismayed by the perceived campus free speech crisis, have little regard
for free speech in other important areas, especially when the speech is
not conservative in orientation. The right’s horror at the left’s
if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”).
117. See infra Section I.C.5.
118. See Anthony L. Fisher, The Free Speech Problem on Campus is Real. It Ultimately Hurts
Dissidents, VOX (Jan. 2, 2017 8:45 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2016/12/13/13931524/freespeech-pen-america-campus-censorship.
119. See, e.g., Scott Jaschik, Free Speech at Brown (Again), INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 7, 2013),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/11/07/brown-u-president-calls-broad-review-lecture-wasshouted-down (poll in Brown University newspaper indicated that while many disagreed with police
commissioner speaker, they did not support those who shouted him down).
120. See Jeffrey Adam Sachs, The “Campus Free Speech Crisis” Ended Last Year, NIKANSEN CTR.
(Jan. 25, 2019), https://niskanencenter.org/blog/the-campus-free-speech-crisis-ended-last-year/.
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abandonment of free speech may thus be self-serving. As one
example, some politicians suggesting legislation to combat disruptive
protests on college campuses also wish to penalize those who engage
in protest boycotts of products made by Israeli companies, by limiting
the ability of those who participate in the Boycott, Divestment, and
Sanctions movement to contract with state governments.121 As another
example, many state legislatures, generally representing conservative
interests, have enacted laws penalizing animal welfare activists or
investigative journalists from accessing farm facilities based on false
premises.122 Several courts have deemed aspects of these so-called
“ag-gag” laws unconstitutional.123
Of course, the constitutional status of boycotts is uncertain,124 and
is far more complex than the right to speak at a university if invited by
a recognized student group.125 Further, the conservatives decrying
liberals’ disregard for free speech may not be the same ones trying to
implement ag-gag laws, which may be motivated by a principled,
viewpoint-neutral desire to protect property rights. However, these
examples offer at least some evidence that some who appear most
vocal about campus free speech concerns may be engaging in secondorder First Amendment cynicism—accusations of First Amendment
cynicism intended to accomplish a political agenda unrelated to
sincerely held, principled views about freedom of speech.
5. Second-Order First Amendment Cynicism
Any given accusation of First Amendment cynicism may itself be a
cynical reflection of the political motives of the accuser and not a
121. Lee Fang & Zaid Jilani, Politicians Campaign on Free Speech While Voting to Punish Those
Who Boycott Israel, INTERCEPT (Mar. 14, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/03/14/campus-freespeech-bds-israel-boycott/.
122. Brandon Keim, Ag-Gag Laws Could Make America Sick, WIRED, (May 2, 2013),
https://www.wired.com/2013/05/ag-gag-public-health/; Esha Bhandari, Court Rules ‘Ag-Gag’ Law
Criminalizing Undercover Reporting Violates the First Amendment, ACLU.org (Jan. 22, 2019),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/freedom-press/court-rules-ag-gag-law-criminalizing-undercoverreporting-violates.
123. See, e.g., Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding
unconstitutional laws criminalizing entry into an agricultural facility by misrepresentation, but upholding
laws criminalizing gaining access to records or employment through misrepresentation); Animal Legal
Defense Fund v. Herbert, 263 F.Supp.3d 1193 (D. Utah 2017).
124. See Erica Goldberg, Federal Courts Examining BDS Movement Boycott Restrictions,
CROWDED THEATER (Apr. 23, 2019), https://inacrowdedtheater.com/2019/04/23/federal-courtsexamining-bds-movement-boycott-restrictions/.
125. See Erica Goldberg, Must Universities “Subsidize” Controversial Ideas: Allocating Security
Fees When Student Groups Host Divisive Speakers, 21 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 349, 373–74 (2011)
(describing case law that heavily scrutinizes university decisions that deny access to student groups use
of campus facilities and viewpoint-based discrimination against speech by student organizations).
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principled defense of a particular interpretation of the First Amendment.
An accusation of this kind would then constitute second-order First
Amendment cynicism. However, accusations of second-order cynicism
may themselves be cynical, intended to undermine legitimate accusations
of First Amendment cynicism. As a result, there is an infinite regress
issue.126 When considering second-order First Amendment cynicism, or
accusations of second-order First Amendment cynicism, the vicious cycle
gets ever more vicious.
In a universe consisting solely of first-order First Amendment
cynicism, perceptions by the left of first-order First Amendment cynicism
by the right may lead those on the left to also interpret free speech
protections cynically, and when the right perceives this, it may follow
suit, perpetuating a vicious cycle. With second-order First Amendment
cynicism, accusations of First Amendment cynicism—themselves
perhaps disingenuous—cause the target of the accusation to lose faith in
a principled free speech regime because those who seem most vocal about
speaking in favor of free speech protections (or those in favor of prudent
limitations on free speech that are consistent with the Constitution) are
doing so cynically. This loss of faith then leads to more First Amendment
cynicism by those falsely accused of first-order cynicism, continuing the
cycle, or perhaps even to accusations of second-order cynicism that the
target perceives as cynical.
As one example, many on the left believe that the right has
manufactured a campus free speech crisis, in which the right is accusing
the left of not caring about free speech when in fact many vocal
proponents of free speech on the right simply wish to use “free speech
martyrdom” as an effective pretext.127 What the left sees from the right
as false accusations of First Amendment cynicism (or second-order First
Amendment cynicism), the right sees as genuine allegations of actual
cynicism, accusations that the left can evade by claiming these
accusations of First Amendment cynicism are, in actuality, second-order
First Amendment cynicism.
Exiting this infinitely recursive cycle of First Amendment cynicism,
which can be infinitely recursive, is difficult because there is no “true”
First Amendment by which we can measure people’s interpretations of
free speech protections. We can, however, examine whether an
126. See supra note 24.
127. See, e.g., Jelani Cobb, The Mistake the Berkeley Protesters Made About Milo Yiannopoulos,
NEW YORKER (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-mistake-theberkeley-protesters-made-about-milo-yiannopoulos. According to Jelani Cobb, Milo Yiannopoulos,
whose anticipated speech at University of California, Berkeley caused violent and disruptive protests, “is
of a blinkered tradition that sees no distinction worth examining between martyrdom and limitations on
one’s ability to attack others. Yiannopoulos’s act is the political equivalent of an N.B.A. guard flopping
in the hope of drawing a foul, a rendition of victimhood so aptly executed as to pass for the real thing.”
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individual’s own views are internally consistent, whether individuals
advance propositions that consistently align with their own political
preferences, and whether their views about the First Amendment are
either impossible to administer or impossible to square with necessary
aspects of Constitutional interpretation or rule of law principles.
Ultimately, of course, it may be impossible to avoid importing one’s
own personal preferences about speech into one’s views about the
doctrine.128 Given that reasonable minds can differ on the doctrine,
perhaps some focus on the result is inevitable. Primary focus on the
result, however, renders the doctrine unprincipled and corrodes the rule
of law by making result more significant than reasoning. There may not
be a baseline “true” First Amendment against which we can determine
which interpretations are cynical, but we can create free speech doctrine
that is as apolitical as possible.
II. RESTORING FAITH IN A NONPARTISAN FREE SPEECH REGIME
An important step in diminishing fears of, and actual instances of, First
Amendment cynicism is to convince scholars, judges, and community
members that the First Amendment can be, and mostly has been,
nonpartisan and perhaps even apolitical. Individuals who believe there is
a principled way to apply the First Amendment are more likely to choose
this path over a cynical but politically advantageous interpretation of free
speech doctrine.
For the purposes of this article, “nonpartisan” means that the First
Amendment can be used as a tool to protect viewpoints across the political
spectrum. Judges can and will invalidate speech restrictions as a violation
of the First Amendment—and can and will uphold regulations as
permissible under the First Amendment—regardless of whether political
party affiliations and political ideology match the viewpoints expressed
in the speech at issue. In this way, the First Amendment is formally
nonpartisan.
For the purposes of this article, “apolitical” means that broad
protections of First Amendment rights can lead to outcomes that do not
necessarily benefit or serve a particular political ideology. The
distribution of speaking rights created by a formally nonpartisan First
Amendment doctrine need not skew our political culture, direct legislative
victories in a particular way, or favor outcomes of a particular political
ideology. In this way, the First Amendment is substantively apolitical. A
128. Dan M. Kahan et al., ‘‘They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct
Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 884 (2012) (finding, in an empirical study, that people’s political
commitments influenced whether they perceived a protest as consisting of protected speech or unprotected
threatening conduct).
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nonpartisan First Amendment protects speech that argues in favor of
Democratic and Republican causes alike. An apolitical First Amendment
yields results beyond the speech itself that do not necessarily skew
conservative—maintaining the current power structures or favoring
certain types of conservative policies—over progressive.
this Part contends that free speech doctrine can be, and has been,
both nonpartisan and apolitical. Section A details why the First
Amendment cannot be progressive, but argues that this fact does not
make strong free speech protections regressive or conservative.
Section B defends the “free speech as liberty” approach as the best way
to retain the nonpartisan and apolitical nature of the First Amendment,
so long as the “free speech as equality” aspects are retained.
A. A Nonpartisan, Apolitical First Amendment
If we, as a society, want to move beyond simply reducing the
perception of First Amendment cynicism and begin restoring broad
support and respect for free speech principles, community members,
judges, and scholars will have to be convinced that the principle of free
speech is worth protecting. Judges, scholars, and members of society may
also have to be shown, if they do not believe in the inherent virtue of the
principle of free speech, that the First Amendment does not serve their
political opponents more than it serves their own causes. For some,
perhaps it is enough to demonstrate that free speech principles prevent the
largest downside risk, or the worst, most tyrannical damage, to their
causes,129 even if free speech serves their political opponents more than it
serves them. This method of convincing resembles John Rawls’s conceit
that that individuals behind the “veil of ignorance” would choose to
distribute social entitlements in a way that prevents the worst
consequences to the least well off, even if this distribution does not
maximize welfare for everyone.130
Although the dominant strategy,131 in a game theoretical sense, may be
to use the First Amendment cynically, widespread acceptance of a
particular understanding of free speech principles may defeat this
inclination. The best way to convince the broadest swath of society in the
continuing inherent and instrumental good of the First Amendment is to

129. According to Louis Michael Seidman, “free speech protects the political left from the most
extreme threats.” Seidman, supra note 12, at 2223. However, this protection against extreme downside
risks “does not make the speech right progressive.” Id.
130. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 31, 92 (1971).
131. A “dominant strategy” is the best strategy for an actor to pursue no matter what strategies other
actors in a given scenario choose. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 11
(1994).
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demonstrate that free speech principles do not serve any given ideology.
Despite the current peak of First Amendment criticism, free speech
doctrine has been, and can continue to be, both nonpartisan and apolitical.
Several progressive scholars have concluded that the First
Amendment, as currently structured, cannot be politically progressive,
defined by one scholar as “the modern political stance favoring an activist
government that strives to achieve the public good, including the
correction of unjust distributions produced by the market and the
dismantling of power hierarchies based on traits like race, nationality,
gender, class, and sexual orientation.”132 To create a First Amendment
that would serve a progressive political ideology, according to two
scholars, would require a “radical rethinking of existing doctrine,” and of
the grammar of the First Amendment.133 The reasons for this are
manifold.
First, progressive ideology often requires government intervention. An
active government exists in tension with the protection of free speech
liberties, which generally require governmental nonfeasance into the
private ordering of speech.134
In addition, this governmental
nonintervention into the figurative “marketplace of ideas”135 means that
those who have earned more money in the literal marketplace of
commerce will be able to afford greater platforms for speech and will
have more property on which to speak. Because the First Amendment is
not triggered by private suppression of speech, and because the
government enforces state background laws unrelated to freedom of
expression, those with the most property will have the greatest ability to
create speech platforms and exclude others form this property.136 In this
way, economic power translates to speaking power which translates to
economic power, and the status quo is perpetuated.
Further, not only does the First Amendment require nonfeasance into
the marketplace of ideas, but it may prohibit governmental action in other
132. Seidman, supra note 12, at 2020.
133. Kessler & Pozen, supra note 12, at 2006.
134. Seidman, supra note 12, at 2240 (“Like the rest of the Constitution, First Amendment doctrine
links freedom to government nonfeasance and oppression to government action. “).
135. A primary rationale underlying strong free speech protections is that an unregulated
“marketplace of ideas” ultimately serves truth. See Goldberg, supra note 56, at 2164 n.1. Many scholars,
however, have called into question the veracity of this notion. See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 13, at 409
(“My claim is that most [nonmundane] speech . . . has little or no net positive epistemic value (that is,
value for helping us discover the truth) . . . .”).
136. Goldberg, supra note 56, at 2185 (“Private citizens can thus refuse entry into their homes to
anyone whose views, on any topic, from the best city for pizza to the most suitable presidential candidate,
they disagree with. If the uninvited guest refuses to leave, the state can enforce property laws, even if they
incidentally affect that speaker's message. Private employers can often fire individuals for speech they
dislike, and social media platforms can remove users for speech they find hateful or otherwise
objectionable.”).
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spheres as well. As noted earlier, from its early days of enforcement, the
Supreme Court intertwined free speech rights and economic liberties.137
The more robustly or aggressively courts enforce free speech rights, the
more they may have to invalidate economic and social regulation. The
First Amendment cannot be fully “economically neutral,” and the view
that it ever was is “illusory.”138
Finally, and most basically, viewpoint neutrality means that courts
cannot favor progressive viewpoints over conservative viewpoints.
Combining this viewpoint neutrality with the current power structures
means that some will be more affected, or more silenced, by particular
types of speech than others.139
For all of these reasons, those who seek governmental intervention to
level the playing field caused by centuries of suppression on the basis of
particular identity characteristics (such as race, gender, and sexual
orientation) may be thwarted in their efforts by the First Amendment.
In many ways, the fact that the First Amendment cannot be progressive
is a good thing and it is evidence of a nonpartisan and perhaps apolitical
First Amendment. Just because the First Amendment cannot primarily
serve progressive ideology does not necessarily mean the First
Amendment has to be regressive or conservative. Certainly, there are
ways in which free speech doctrine perpetuates the status quo, and gives
those with economic or social advantages more free speech protections,
with which they can further entrench their privileges and power. But
protecting those disfavored by the political branches against
governmental censorship means that minority rights and the rights of
those at the vanguard, or outside, of any given social hierarchy will be
protected, whether they are advocating for progressive causes or not.140
Although the state action doctrine does benefit those with greater
resources and power, and although corporations receive greater speech
rights now than in the past, the current conceptualization and application
of free speech rights both protects progressive speech and leads to
progressive political outcomes. In addition, much economic regulation
137. See supra Section I.C.
138. Kessler, supra note 18, at 2001.
139. Many feminists argue, for example, that pornography subordinates and objectifies women,
leading to their silencing—either because they choose not to speak or because others do not take the
content of their messages as seriously. For a summary of these arguments, see Goldberg, supra note 56,
at 2180 & accompanying notes.
140. These rights will be protected as against governmental suppression but will not be protected
as against private citizens deterring or disincentivizing others from speaking. Many progressive scholars
do not believe the greatest threat to free speech comes from the government. See Wu, supra note 13, at
548–49 (arguing that the greatest threat to our free speech environment is no longer government
suppression, but the attention of listeners and private parties’ disruption of the channels of
communication). However, the problem of vying for the attention of listeners is a feature, not a bug, of
the ideal marketplace of ideas, and the Internet has democratized free speech far beyond traditional media.
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can still be upheld, even under a robust interpretation of what constitutes
protected speech. There are ways to cabin the expanding commercial
speech doctrine to balance interests; these doctrinal possibilities are
explored in Part III.
Most fundamentally, sacrificing progressivism to a free speech
doctrine that protects viewpoints antithetical to progressive ideology
means that courts will also protect viewpoints that promote progressive
ideology. In this way, free speech doctrine is nonpartisan. Formally, no
side wins.141 The deregulation of the marketplace of ideas often benefits
progressive speech, such as labor picketing and civil rights marches.142
Our First Amendment jurisprudence on academic freedom, as another
example, primarily benefits academics with left-leaning views and
historically protected professors with suspected associations with the
Communist Party.143
Courts have protected speech of radical and subversive or
counterculture thinkers and actors throughout the First Amendment’s
history,144 and that trend continues today.145 Although imperfect, courts
can and do have a grand history of protecting speech regardless of
viewpoint.
By requiring governmental acceptance of the speech of the
disempowered, the First Amendment can be not only nonpartisan, but
apolitical, leading to substantive outcomes that favor progressives as
much as conservatives. Despite many progressive scholars’ calls for
increased regulation of the Internet,146 to the extent that progressivism
favors marginalized communities over elites, the increased
democratization of free speech, through media like the Internet, has
141. Of course, formal equality, while nonpartisan, may not lead to ideologically neutral results, or
even the optimal access to the marketplace of ideas. See Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an
Antisubordinating First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2156 (2018) (“But to say that courts
could, and should, interpret the First Amendment's command in a manner that is less constrained by the
requirement of formal equality . . . is to say that courts could, and should, engage in a far more realistic
analysis than they currently do of the political, economic, and social realities that impede, or enable, the
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” public debate that the First Amendment is supposed to make
possible--and develop rules in response.”). However, the First Amendment can also be substantively
apolitical. See infra pp. 35–37.
142. Seidman, supra note 12, at 2222.
143. See Neil H. Hutchins et al., Faculty, the Courts, and the First Amendment, 120 PENN ST. L.
REV. 1027, 1032 (2016) (“Academic freedom became viewed as possessing a constitutional dimension
during the Cold War era, when McCarthyism inspired government officials to inject themselves in public
education for the purpose of identifying and expelling communist sympathizers.”).
144. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (protecting the academic freedom
rights of university professor suspected of having ties to Communism).
145. In Matal v. Tam, for example, the Court recently held that the Patent and Trademark Office
cannot deny a trademark to an Asian-American band seeking to reclaim Asian-American stereotypes and
slurs by naming themselves “The Slants.” 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017)
146. See Wu, supra note 13, at 572–73.
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served progressivism as well, even if companies like Facebook have First
Amendment rights to create their own speech architecture.147 When
marginalized, countercultural voices are given counter-majoritarian free
speech rights, they can use these rights to change the way disempowered
communities are seen and heard, and how the law responds to these
communities. Recent examples include the #MeToo movement, which
highlights sexual assault and harassment, and the popularity of memes
sharing anti-racist information.148 The #MeToo movement is not only a
social and cultural phenomenon; it may lead to changes in the ways the
law protects victims of harassment, who are usually women, and how
judges sentence those convicted of rape and sexual assault.149
Reshaping the First Amendment in order to better serve progressive
goals is a fool’s errand because it will so disrupt First Amendment law
that it will not even be useful to progressives. Progressive scholars who
recognize this believe that power should be reclaimed through the
democracy, not necessarily though the courts; Professor Seidman further
believes that the First Amendment should be demystified as a necessary
and inevitable tool for social good.150 However, the public would not be
served by diminished respect for the First Amendment. One intriguing
reason
Seidman
cites
as
supporting
First
Amendment
“demystification”151—that free speech as a right is dogmatic and
“dictatorial”152—ultimately does not make much sense. According to
Seidman, the existence of the First Amendment in the Constitution means
that the issue of free speech is, ironically, not truly up for debate.153
The error of this argument is that although a constitutional right creates
difficulty for change, the First Amendment is the reason we can debate
whether free speech is a virtue. Because of our First Amendment
protections, we are free to debate the worthiness of the First Amendment.
147. See Goldberg, supra note 56, at 2189–90.
148. See Monica Anderson & Skye Toor, How Social Media Users Have Discussed Sexual
RES.
CTR.
(Oct.
11,
2018),
Harassment
Since
#MeToo
Went
Viral,
PEW
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/11/how-social-media-users-have-discussed-sexualharassment-since-metoo-went-viral/.
149. See, e.g., Charisse Jones, #MeToo One Year Later: Cosby, Moonves Fall, Sex Harassment
Fight at Work Far From Over, USA TODAY (Oct. 4, 2018 12:11 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/10/04/metoo-workplace-sexual-harassment-laws-policiesprogress/1378191002/.
150. According to Seidman, “[i]f the Constitution is not, and cannot be, a fair and neutral framework
that everyone is bound to accept, that is a reason to oppose constitutional obligation. If progressives are
harmed by First Amendment mystification, they should favor demystifying the Amendment rather than
embracing it.” Seidman, supra note 12, at 2245.
151. Id. (“If progressives are harmed by First Amendment mystification, they should favor
demystifying the Amendment rather than embracing it.”).
152. Id. at 2247.
153. Id. (“If the Constitution requires something, then that is the end of the argument, at least in
American constitutional culture.”).
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Instead of feeling beholden to the current First Amendment, some have
even proposed amendments to the Constitution to limit the First
Amendment, in light of cases like Citizens United.154 As long as
viewpoint neutrality persists in free speech doctrine, we are free to
consider the extent of our free speech protections and determine whether
we are satisfied that they are being applied in a nonpartisan, apolitical
way.
Indeed, even cases that appear to favor substantively conservative
outcomes eventually aid progressive causes and vice versa. Thus, cases
that seemingly favor one side of the political aisle end up benefitting the
other side. For example, the decision in Hurley v. Irish American Gay,
Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, which held that a private parade
can exclude the float of an organization comprised of gay, lesbian, and
bisexual Irish Americans,155 ultimately supports the Charlotte Pride
Parade’s right to exclude the conservative group Gays for Trump.156 The
courts’ general antipathy towards censorship of student speech often
protects conservative speech,157 but also shields students from
punishment for wearing bracelets declaring “I Heart Boobies” that
promote breast cancer awareness.158 The Supreme Court’s decision in
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,159 the anti-authoritarian
decision that permitted public school students to refuse to stand and salute
the flag,160 was marshalled in Janus to allow a conservative child support
specialist to refuse to contribute to his public sector union.161
154. Press Release, Rep. Jamie Raskin, House of Representatives, Bipartisan Constitutional
Amendment to Overturn Citizens United Introduced (Jan. 4, 2019), https://raskin.house.gov/media/pressreleases/bipartisan-constitutional-amendment-overturn-citizens-united-introduced.
155. 515 U.S. 557, 559–61 (1995).
156. Eugene Volokh, Can the Charlotte Pride Parade Exclude Gays for Trump Float?,
WASH. POST: BLOG (June 8, 2017, 6:52 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2017/06/08/can-charlotte-pride-parade-exclude-gays-for-trumpfloat/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.86b39f960176.
157. See, e.g., Blair v. Shippensburg University, 280 F. Supp. 2d 357, 365 (2003) (finding university
speech code and harassment policy overbroad after plaintiffs claimed that a reluctance “to advance certain
controversial theories or ideas regarding any number of political or social issues because ... she feared that
discussion of such theories might be sanctionable under applicable University [S]peech [C]ode[ ]”).
158. See B.H. v. Easton Area School District, 725 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2013).
159. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
160. Id. at 642 (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”).
161. See Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463, 2464, 2478 (2018) (citing West Virginia Bd. of
Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). Justice Kagan’s dissent takes issue with the majority’s use of
Barnette to justify the view that compelling speech works a greater injury than suppressing speech because
Barnette is an “exceptional” case. Id. at 2494 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The majority posits that compelling
speech always works a greater injury, and so always requires a greater justification. But the only case the
majority cites for that reading of our precedent is possibly (thankfully) the most exceptional in our First
Amendment annals: It involved the state forcing children to swear an oath contrary to their religious
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Of course, courts may not always apply the First Amendment
consistently, independent of viewpoint, which leads to perhaps legitimate
accusations of First Amendment cynicism. In Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project,162 one of the few cases to hold that a speech restriction
survived strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court upheld a law prohibiting
“material support” to terrorist organizations, even when this material
support came in the form of speech advising the organizations on how to
more peacefully accomplish their goals.163 Perhaps the Justices allowed
their antipathy towards terrorism to color their analysis.
Judges are human beings. Some threats may be considered too great
to ignore, or judges’ political inclinations may get the better of them.
Perfect political neutrality is aspirational and asymptotic, but the constant
striving betters our jurisprudence. Even just in the last decade, the
Supreme Court has decided many First Amendment cases involving
controversial speech in a nonpartisan way with wide margins in favor of
First Amendment rights.164 Some have charged the Roberts Court with
favoring only certain types of speech, as Justice Roberts has authored
opinions deferring to the government in public school and prison cases,
yet expanding speech rights for corporations.165 However, as mentioned
earlier, expanding speech rights for corporations is justifiable to the extent
the Court does not wish to discriminate on the basis of speaker identity or
wishes to use corporations as proxies for listeners’ rights—although
limiting principles to the expansion of corporate rights should be
incorporated into the doctrine and will be discussed later in Part III. And
the fact that the government sometimes wins in free speech cases does not
necessarily reflect First Amendment cynicism since there are nonpartisan,
institutional reasons to be especially deferential to the government for
beliefs.”) (internal citations omitted).
162. 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
163. Id. at 30 (holding that Congress was justified in finding that even when material support
consists of imparting legitimate knowledge, this support can further the violent goals of a terrorist
organization, especially if “support frees up other resources within the organization that may be put to
violent ends.).
164. See, e.g. Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018) (invalidating state law
banning political apparel at polling places as impermissibly vague); Lozman v. City of Rivera Beach, 138
S. Ct. 1935, 1954–55 (holding that probable cause to arrest someone who disrupted city council meeting
does not bar First Amendment retaliation claim); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (invalidating provision
of federal law denying trademarks to marks that disparage groups of people); Packingham v. North
Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (invalidating state law denying sex offenders access to certain social
media websites); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 459-60 (2011) (invalidating damages for intentional
infliction of emotional distress against controversial religious group protesting at military funerals);
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (invalidating statute criminalizing depictions of animal
torture).
165. See, e.g., David H. Gans, Roberts at 10: The Strongest Free Speech Court in History?,
Constitutional
Accountability
Center,
https://www.theusconstitution.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/Roberts_at_10_09_First_Amendment_Snapshot_0.pdf.
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speech in public lower schools and prisons.
The best way to generally preserve and continue to facilitate an
apolitical First Amendment is to conceive of free speech as liberty, but
also to remember that free speech as equality serves important goals.
Where both of these approaches can be served, faith in the First
Amendment can be at its highest.
B. The “Neutrality” of a Libertarian First Amendment
Because free speech doctrine, by and large, can be both nonpartisan
and apolitical, dramatic changes in the doctrine are not necessary to
preserve its nonpartisan, apolitical nature. The First Amendment cannot
be reshaped to be more progressive without compromising both
progressivism and the most essential, nonpartisan, and apolitical aspects
of the doctrine. Restoration of belief in a bipartisan First Amendment
therefore requires acceptance of civil libertarian tradition, with its strong
state action doctrine and viewpoint neutrality, with some limiting
principles. This section analyzes why “free speech as liberty,” with its
emphasis on viewpoint neutrality and governmental nonfeasance, must
remain the default paradigm for First Amendment doctrine. There are
contexts, however, where “free speech as equality,” which guarantees
resources for marginal or underrepresented speakers, best serves a
nonpartisan, apolitical First Amendment.166
As explored in the previous section, the currently dominant free speech
as liberty approach does not necessarily have to lead to libertarian
political outcomes. This means that even though First Amendment
jurisprudence has a libertarian valence, it can still be apolitical.167
Further, free speech as liberty does not favor speech expressing libertarian
ideas, meaning it can be nonpartisan. Although one could argue that, at a
high level of abstraction, the choice of “free speech as liberty” is itself
political, these arguments would render any interpretive method
unavoidably political. The act of interpreting law instead of flipping a
coin could also be considered political, at an even higher level of
abstraction. For our purposes, what is important is that “free speech as
liberty” will treat fairly speech across the political spectrum and that all
ideologies can benefit from this approach.
To preserve the nonpartisan, apolitical aspects of the First Amendment,
the free speech as liberty model is the best starting point. Because, in that
model, all efforts to “skew the private ordering of speech” are treated with
166. These terms and their basic approaches come from Kathleen Sullivan’s Two Concepts of
Freedom of Speech. See supra Section I.C.1.
167. See supra Section II.A. (arguing that our free speech doctrine has been, and can continue to
be, generally nonpartisan and apolitical).
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skepticism,168 free speech as liberty best preserves the viewpoint
neutrality and governmental nonfeasance critical to a nonpartisan and
apolitical First Amendment. The dominant free speech as liberty regime
simply means the Supreme Court takes a generally libertarian approach
to free speech doctrine. As noted in the previous section, the doctrine
cannot, on a large scale, re-distribute power or cater to the most
vulnerable in ways ideal for progressives. This is a feature, not a bug, of
a nonpartisan First Amendment, but it means judges need to be vigilant
to ensure that the First Amendment is also not predominantly
conservative or regressive.
Accepting the generally civil libertarian orientation of free speech
doctrine does not mean the free speech as equality model, which provides
special solicitude to the speech of the minority or the “little guy,”169 does
not have an important place in the jurisprudence. There are contexts in
which the free speech as equality model is consistent with a nonpartisan
First Amendment and can foster progressive ideals—to balance out the
ways in which a nonpartisan First Amendment yields conservative or
libertarian results. However, because free speech as equality “endorses a
kind of affirmative action for marginal speech,”170 its approach should
prevail only in cases where free speech as equality makes governmental
discrimination on the basis of viewpoint less likely. Cases of this nature,
where the free speech equality model serves a nonpartisan First
Amendment, generally occur where the government has already
intervened, such as cases involving government subsidies, or in cases
where the government must intervene because nonintervention would
give the government too much discretion to discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint, such as heckler’s veto cases.
As examples, the government must generally allow access for speech
on public land classified as a public forum.171 This access provides
speakers with fewer resources advantages in the marketplace of ideas that
they would not otherwise have had.172 The designation of land as a public
forum benefits speech across the political spectrum, but on the whole
favors those with less money and power, thus creating substantive
168. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 145.
169. Id. at 145–46.
170. Id. at 145.
171. See id.
172. In a traditional or a designated public forum, content-based restrictions on speech must survive
strict scrutiny, and even content neutral restrictions must allow sufficient access to the forum. See Perry
Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (“For the state to enforce a contentbased exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that
it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. The state may also enforce regulations of the time, place, and
manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.”) (citations omitted).
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equality in a way that aligns with progressive ideology. This restriction
on government censorship on public land bolsters the apolitical aspects of
the First Amendment by undercutting some of the conservative results
inherent in nonpartisan free speech doctrine.
The free speech as equality model works well for traditional and
designated public fora because the government is already involved in land
ownership and governmental nonfeasance is impossible, so requiring
equal access ensures that the government does not have the discretion to
discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint. Of course, the
government may place conditions on speech when it explicitly funds
certain activities,173 even if it may not deny government benefits on the
basis of viewpoint, and has much more discretion to restrict speech in
nonpublic fora, such as schools and prisons.174 Courts must continue to
distinguish public from nonpublic fora, and to distinguish government
funding activities from participation in government programs/access to
government benefits,175 in a way that makes free speech doctrine less
political. Student activities fees at public universities, for example, must
be administered in a viewpoint neutral fashion,176 providing resources to
groups that might not be able to procure their own funding.
Another example of the free speech as equality model best serving an
apolitical, nonpartisan First Amendment is the doctrine’s approach to
instances where controversial speakers elicit violent or destructive
reactions from listeners. In those cases, the government may not pass
security or cleanup costs off to speakers in the form of increased costs for
speaking permits.177 This rule, which may be described as providing
benefits to controversial speech, embraces an anti-“heckler’s veto”
principle: the government must not punish speakers for the violent
reactions of listeners, thus preventing hecklers from serving as censors.178
173. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (holding that the government may prohibit
recipients of public family planning funds to engage in abortion counseling because “[t]he Government
can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it
believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks
to deal with the problem in another way”).
174. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 159–60 (discussing how free speech rights do not extend to places
like airports and schools and how the government may limit the rights of public employees).
175. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744, 1761 (2017) (distinguishing the trademark regime, where
the government may not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint from direct, monetary government funding
of certain activities).
176. Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
177. Forsyth County v. The Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992); see also Erica Goldberg,
Must Universities Subsidize Controversial Ideas: Allocating Security Fees When Student Groups Host
Divisive Speakers, 21 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 349 (2011) (applying Forsyth to public universities
charging student groups for hosting outside speakers and arguing security fees must be imposed in a
content neutral way).
178. Goldberg, supra note 177, at 358–59 (discussing heckler’s veto jurisprudence and
scholarship).
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Here, free speech as equality protects the speech of those on the
margins of society, especially those without vast resources, and ensures
nondiscrimination by the government. One reason for the heckler’s veto
principle is that the government cannot be given too much discretion to
determine what price to charge for speech (in the form of speaking
permits) because variations in cost may conceal governmental decisions
to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.179 When the government grants
permits to speakers wishing to host parades or rallies, it cannot give itself
such broad latitude that it can hide discrimination on the basis of
viewpoint.180
Indeed, the government generally has an affirmative duty to protect
speakers instead of arresting them181 – and thus state actors do not have
the leeway to alter how much security they provide to speakers based on
whether or not state actors (e.g., the police) deem the speech acceptable
or objectionable. In this way, state actors, if they already provide police
assistance to prevent violence generally (which every state does), must do
so to protect controversial speakers, regardless of ability to pay. This
approach preserves viewpoint neutrality by prohibiting the state from
determining which speech it prefers when providing security services.
In cases where the government must necessarily intervene, free speech
as equality ensures that the government does not discriminate on the basis
of viewpoint when it provides services, grants subsidies, or otherwise has
the ability to exercise potentially pretextual discretion. Limited to these
contexts, where the government already is intervening in some way—
either on its own land, in providing subsidies or issuing permits, or in
providing background security generally, free speech as equality serves a
nonpartisan First Amendment well. Outside of these contexts, however,
free speech as equality has the potential to undermine the nonpartisan
viewpoint neutrality of free speech doctrine.
When free speech as liberty and free speech as equality are in conflict
with each other, the most apolitical solution is to favor the free speech as
liberty model. Deferring too much to the free speech as equality model
requires governmental determinations as to who is worthy of special
179. Id. at 354–56 (discussing Forsyth’s disapproval of licensing schemes that provide too much
discretion to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint or that facially discriminate based on listener reaction).
180. Forsyth, 505 U.S. 123 at 130 (holding that a permit licensing scheme in a public forum “may
not delegate overly broad licensing discretion to a government official” and that “any permit scheme
controlling the time, place, and manner of speech must not be based on the content of the message).
Charging extra fees for speech where the government expects listeners to have violent reactions
impermissibly discriminated against speech on the basis of its message. Id. at 135–36.
181. In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), the Supreme Court overturned a conviction for
speech that disturbed the peace because police should have handled the hostile crowd instead of silencing
the speaker. Id. at 544-45, 550. However, if the police cannot stave off an angry crowd, they may interfere
with the speech of a lawful speaker. See Brian A. Freeman, The Supreme Court and First Amendment
Rights of Students in the Public Schools, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 12 n.64 (1984).
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governmental solicitude, thus compromising viewpoint neutrality. Courts
should be careful not to extend jurisprudence on the heckler’s veto into
spheres where the government has not acted—and need not act—in order
to reduce governmental discretion and solicitude that may foster
viewpoint discrimination. In those spaces, requiring governmental action
to serve the free speech as equality model would give the government too
much discretion to judge speech based on its underlying viewpoint.
For this reason, we should be wary of extending principles relating to
the heckler’s veto, as Professor Tim Wu proposes, to combating
everything from fraud to harassment on the Internet.182 According to
Professor Wu, “[t]he police officer whose duty it is to protect speakers
from harassment and attack needs to turn his or her efforts to protecting
online speech.”183 Extending heckler’s veto principles beyond protecting
speakers from violent or disruptive conduct into protecting speakers from
objectionable and potentially unprotected speech by others on the Internet
cannot be accomplished, however, without making judgments about the
content of the heckler’s speech, whereas the government’s duty to protect
controversial speakers from imminent violence does not require judgment
calls about the nature of the speech at issue. Instead of extending free
speech as equality principles into domains where they may facilitate
viewpoint discrimination, courts should simply apply the current
doctrines balancing tort principles and free speech rights to the Internet,
with the usual high standards for determining when speech becomes
unprotected harassment, threats, libel, or fraud.184 The free speech as
liberty model generally works best for online speech because it is not a
governmental forum, and the government’s intervention is not a prerequisite to the speech or necessary to prevent imminent violence.
The Court can massage the doctrine, however, to facilitate the reality
and the perception that everyone benefits from free speech doctrine, not
just the rich or the corporations.
III. DE-POLITICIZING THE DOCTRINE AND ENSURING FAIR PROTECTION
There are ways that the Supreme Court can reduce the perception that
the First Amendment is currently a tool of conservative policies, or that
liberals have abandoned free speech in an unprincipled way. One way is
to more closely control the docket of free speech cases. Another way is
to place limiting principles into the current doctrine to ensure that those
182. See Wu, supra note 13, at 572.
183. Id.
184. See Erica Goldberg, Emotional Duties, 47 CONN. L. REV. 809, 824, 865–66 (2015) (exploring
why certain categories of speech, such as libel, harassment, and obscenity, are unprotected and discussing
the doctrines that create the exceptions from protection).
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who most need the First Amendment can receive its benefits.
This Part first discusses how the Court should arrange its First
Amendment docket to best guard against accusations of First
Amendment cynicism. Next, this Part discusses ways to approach the
doctrine to move it closer to its aspirational goals of being apolitical
and nonpartisan, especially in the areas of corporate speech, the
intersection of free speech and economic restrictions, and hate speech.
A. Managing the Docket
The Court should be mindful of the cases it selects for its docket. Chief
Justice Roberts cares greatly about the Supreme Court’s legitimacy,185
especially about the public’s perception of the Court as legitimate.186 In
the current climate of First Amendment skepticism, the Court would be
better served taking cases where the free speech as liberty and free speech
and equality models overlap. Cases where free speech as liberty and free
speech as equality overlap will generally involve a politically unpopular,
marginalized, or somehow vulnerable actor, especially one who does not
belong to a group that traditionally wields power or privilege, being
denied—by the government—certain speech rights or access to particular
speech media.
An excellent recent example of where the interests underlying free
speech as liberty and free speech as equality intersect is Packingham v.
North Carolina.187 In that case, convicted sex offenders who completed
their sentences, like Lester Packingham, were prohibited from accessing
social media sites that had particular functions, such as the ability to
directly message people.188 Convicted sex offers in North Carolina,
therefore, could not use websites such as Washingtonpost.com or
Facebook.189 Indeed, Mr. Packingham was convicted under this law for
creating a Facebook post about a good experience getting a traffic ticket
dismissed.190 The Court unanimously overturned this conviction, with
185. See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi, ObamaCare as a Window on Judicial Strategy, 80 TENN. L. REV. 763,
767 & n.22 (2013) (“Roberts has stressed throughout his chief justiceship that building large coalitions is
key to the Court's legitimacy and his own measure of success.”).
186. Some see Chief Justice Roberts as desiring to preserve the Court’s power, which is distinct but
related to the public’s perception of the Court’s legitimacy. See Benjamin Softness, Preserving Judicial
Supremacy Come Heller High Water, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 623 627 n. 24 (2013) (citing sources for the
proposition that the Chief Justice’s opinion in NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), the cases involving
a constitutional challenge to the Affordable Care Act, “was a masterclass in power preservation”).
187. 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
188. North Carolina made it a criminal offense for registered sex offenders “to access a commercial
social networking Web site where the sex offender knows that the site permits minor children to become
members or to create or maintain personal Web pages.” Id. at 1733.
189. Id. at 1736-37.
190. Id. at 1734.
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five Justices signing onto the majority opinion, three Justices concurring
in the result, and one Justice taking no part in the opinion. Central to the
Court’s ruling was the view that “to foreclose access to social media
altogether is to prevent the user from engaging in the legitimate exercise
of First Amendment rights.”191
Packingham fits nicely into the free speech as liberty model because
the government had deprived Mr. Packingham of the ability to engage in
speech online, blocking access to the marketplace of ideas for those it
deemed too dangerous. The case also fits nicely into the free speech as
equality model because convicted sex offenders are a maligned and
stigmatized population, and often the government isolates and punishes
this group in ways that become oppressive. Convicted felons are also a
generally vulnerable and less powerful population. Because the state
cannot police and prevent sex offenses by simply prohibiting access to
certain speech private forums, like Facebook, the government will have
to spend more money policing sex crimes in other ways. In this way, Mr.
Packingham’s speech, or access to social media, can be viewed as both
impermissibly penalized (free speech as liberty) but also requiring
subsidization (free speech as equality) by the government. The
government, not he, will incur the increased costs, in the wake of
Packingham v. North Carolina, of prosecuting recidivist sex offenders.
This subsidization is not diluting the ability of others from speaking in
order to give Mr. Packingham greater speech rights, but simply works as
a way to prevent the government from using its power to affect the private
marketplace of ideas. A case like Packingham is exactly the kind of case,
unlike, say, Citizens United,192 where using the free speech as equality
approach would lead to less viewpoint discrimination, not more.
Granting certiorari in cases like Packingham, which will garner large
victories for free speech and will allow the public to see that First
Amendment doctrine need not be political, or politically polarizing.
Then, when cases like Janus are decided, there is more of a buffer
preventing the public from losing faith precipitously in First Amendment
jurisprudence.
Of course, this type of docket-managing will succeed only if the
Justices wish to de-politicize both actual First Amendment doctrine and
the public’s perception of free speech jurisprudence. Some have accused
Justices of purposely selecting cases to lay the groundwork for results

191. Id. at 1737.
192. In Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), the majority rejected prior cases’ application of the
antidistortion principle, where the speech of the more powerful can be silenced in order to allow other
speech to have increased influence. See id. at 349 (“If the antidistortion rationale were to be accepted,
however, it would permit Government to ban political speech simply because the speaker is an association
that has taken on the corporate form.”).
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they like politically. For example, Justice Kagan noted, in Janus, that
some Justices “were working overtime,”193 trying to cast doubt upon
Abood without overruling it, in a “6–year crusade to ban agency fees.”194
Her view seems to be that some Justices were inserting language into
cases, or perhaps selecting cases strategically, to, over time, erode the
underpinnings of Abood before it could be explicitly overruled. Many
have also criticized Justice Alito for purposely attempting to find cases
like Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, where
a Christian baker asserted a First Amendment right to refuse to create a
custom-made wedding cake for a same-sex wedding, so that he can
advance a particular partisan agenda.195
If Justice Alito has a particular view of free speech, and that informs
how he selects cases, critics who simply disagree with the outcomes he
reaches do not have a true, principled objection to either his selection of
cases or his jurisprudence. However, if Justice Alito is choosing free
speech cases that allow him to reach results he prefers—in a way that is
unrelated to his views about the First Amendment—he is contributing to
First Amendment cynicism and justifying allegations of First Amendment
cynicism.
If so, scrutinizing his docket-managing is justified. Justices seeking to
politicize the First Amendment should be called to account for their First
Amendment cynicism, and we should develop a constitutional culture
where Justices are encouraged to fully articulate their broader theories of
jurisprudence and how their opinions do not consistently accord with their
political views. However, the best way to do this may not be through
easily and glibly quoted (and misquoted) language in a Supreme Court
opinion. Rather, rigorous, academic, open-minded scholarship should be
devoted to gauging whether Janus is justified, and whether Justice Alito
is consistent in his view of free speech. And even if Justice Alito is
unprincipled, which he may be, Janus was signed onto by four other
Justices, including former Justice Kennedy, who has an expansive view
of free speech rights that easily accords with the outcome the majority
reached in Janus. Allegations of free speech cynicism should not be made
lightly, as they create a vicious cycle, perhaps one we are currently
experiencing.

193. Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 2500.
195. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). The Court ultimately decided the case based on the baker’s religious
liberty, postponing the question of whether custom-designed cakes are speech that cannot be compelled
by anti-discrimination laws for another day. See id. at 1732.
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B. Corporate Speech and Economic Regulations
Although unpopular among progressives, our current approach to the
speech rights of corporations, especially as exemplified by cases like
Citizens United, does fit well within the free speech as liberty vision of
the First Amendment.196 However, there are ways the Court can mitigate
the politically skewing effects of broad free speech rights for corporate
actors. For example, the Court can partially disentangle free speech rights
from economic liberties by limiting the exceptions created from generally
applicable economic restrictions for speakers such as the media and
religious individuals. The Court should further clarify that in the
commercial speech context, compelled speech is not as constitutionally
problematic as suppression of speech.
First, many of the seminal cases that bound up economic liberties with
free speech rights involved exceptions to generally applicable laws for the
media or religious pamphleteers.197 The Supreme Court can hold, without
overruling many of these cases, that exceptions from generally applicable
economic regulations that make speech more expensive, but do not
compel speech or necessarily prohibit speech, will be granted only if the
economic regulation (such as a tax) will severely restrict the speaker’s
ability to speak. The Jehovah’s witness peddling-tax cases would have to
be overruled, to the extent that the witnesses had not alleged that the
peddling taxes “were so excessive as to be prohibitory,” although these
cases perhaps could be sustained statutorily by the principle that selling
religious literature may not be a commercial enterprise, and thus may not
fall within the legislature’s licensing or tax provisions.198
Of course, the government cannot specifically target religious
pamphleteers or newspapers,199 but it can include them in generally
applicable economic restrictions—including restrictions that affect the
profits received from advertising200—unless those restrictions would
severely curtail an individual or corporation’s speech activities. By
making a few doctrinal changes, which cohere with the rest of First
Amendment jurisprudence,201 the Court can begin to disentangle speech
196. See infra Section II.A.
197. See supra Section I.C.2.
198. See Murdock v. PA, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943) (“But the mere fact that the religious literature
is ‘sold’ by itinerant preachers rather than ‘donated’ does not transform evangelism into a commercial
enterprise.”).
199. Thus, a tax on newspapers of a certain circulation, as in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233 (1936), will still be unconstitutional, as a targeting on certain types of newspapers.
200. Thus, the Court could repudiate the dicta in Grosjean that anything that has a tendency to affect
advertising revenue is a prior restraint on speech. See Kessler, supra note 12, at 1966–67.
201. Religious speech is generally not treated with special solicitude under the First Amendment.
According to a compelling view, the First Amendment deprives the government of the power to restrict
all speech, and thus does not grant special deference to any particular brand of speech. See Jay S. Bybee,
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rights from economic regulations.
In addition, the Court can and should more explicitly note that in the
commercial speech context, compelled speech does not work as great a
First Amendment harm as the suppression of speech. As Amanda Shanor
noted, “while the Supreme Court recently affirmed the asymmetry of
constitutional protection that applies to regulations that compel rather
than restrict commercial speech in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v.
United States,202 some circuit court decisions have not been so clear.”203
In Milavetz, the Court cited prior decisions for the proposition that
“[u]njustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements offend the
First Amendment by chilling protected speech, but ‘an advertiser's rights
are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are
reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of
consumers.’”204
By reaffirming with no ambiguity that disclosure requirements related
to preventing deception in the commercial context are generally not
constitutionally problematic, the Court could mitigate the worry that, in
an era of soft paternalism where regulations take the form of mandatory
disclosure instead of outright prohibition, free speech will not undo the
administrative state.205 Compelled speech is not as problematic as
suppression of speech with respect to corporations engaging in purely
commercial speech because the primary reasons the First Amendment
prohibits compelled speech are inapplicable. In Janus, for example, the
Court held that compelled speech is equally corrosive as suppression of
speech, but the Court’s rationale was applicable only in cases where an
individual, such as Mark Janus is speaking, not a corporation. In Janus,
the reason compelled speech was considered even more harmful than the
suppression of speech is because compelled speech forces individuals to
disobey and explicitly disavow their consciences. Corporate disclosures
involving purely commercial (not political) speech do not suffer from this
problem because a corporation is not an individual, and thus does not have
the same autonomy rights. Courts should therefore hold that requiring
certain types of disclosures for corporations are permissible.
This distinction between suppression of speech and compulsion of
speech in the commercial speech context would not compromise the
Common Ground: Robert Jackson, Antonin Scalia, and a Power Theory of the First Amendment, 75 TUL.
L. REV. 251, 313–16 (2000) (“[T]he First Amendment is an immunity of general applicability, which
means that when the government has violated anyone's First Amendment rights, the law (as applied to
everyone) is unconstitutional.”).
202. 559 U.S. 229 (2010).
203. Shanor, supra note 18, at 152.
204. Milavetz, 559 U.S. 229, 250 (2010) (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of
Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
205. See supra Section I.A.
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rationales behind Citizens United. The federal law overturned in Citizens
United, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, involved suppression of
core, political speech: a documentary about Hillary Clinton made by a
nonprofit corporation. By prohibiting corporations to spend money on
documentaries like the one at issue in Citizens United, the Court was
suppressing speech and discriminating on speech based on speaker
identity, skewing the marketplace of ideas for all listeners. However, in
cases of mandatory disclosures for corporations, especially those that are
related to preventing deception, there should be less protection for
compelled speech because the corporation is not being asked to betray
individual convictions, so the rationale behind compelled speech—not
wanting to force individuals to declare something antithetical to their
private consciences—is not relevant.
This logic also explains why controversial corporate disclosures that
are an attempt to affect the marketplace of ideas, especially if the content
compelled undermines the views of the corporation, should be
unconstitutional. Preserving the distinction between compelled speech
and suppression of speech for commercial, nonpolitical, corporate speech
does not mean that all compelled corporate disclosures will be
constitutionally permissible. Forcing a private utility company to include
in its billing statements opinions of third parties that contradict content
expressed in the utility’s newsletter was deemed unconstitutional.206 The
state’s interest must still be in informing consumers about attributes of the
specific product in a way that either prevents deception or provides facts
about something consumers have expressed an interest in knowing.207 In
general, greater scrutiny should be given to disclosure requirements that
go beyond preventing deception, as these may be intended to affect
consumer preferences as opposed to simply inform consumers about the
attributes of a product. Further, when the speech becomes controversial
or not “purely factual,”208 or is designed to influence the marketplace of
ideas instead of the actual marketplace, then the compelled disclosure
should not pass the Central Hudson test for commercial speech.209
Recently, the Supreme Court invalidated disclosure requirements on
206. Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Public Utilities Comm’n of California, 475 U.S. 1, 4, 11 (1986).
207. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a permissible government
interest need not be solely in preventing deception to consumers, but did not articulate exactly what type
of interests are sufficient. See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(allowing “substantial” interests to justify compelled corporate disclosure, although noting that the term
substantial “seems elusive”).
208. Id. at 27. In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, the Supreme
Court held that purely factual and uncontroversial disclosure requirements that relate to commercial
transactions will be upheld unless they are “unjustified and unduly burdensome.” 471 U.S. 626, 651
(1985).
209. Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 26 (applying Central Hudson to “country of origin” labeling for
meat and finding the mandatory disclosure requirement constitutional).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss4/1

44

Goldberg: First Amendment Cynicism and Redemption

2020]

FIRST AMENDMENT CYNICISM AND REDEMPTION

1003

so-called “crisis pregnancy centers,” which provide services for women
in order to serve as an alternative to their procuring of an abortion,
because abortion is “anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic,’”210 and the
disclosure requirements were either unduly burdensome,211 or unrelated
to the specific services being provided by the pregnancy centers.212 This
decision accords with the notion that corporate disclosure requirements
should generally pass constitutional muster, unless they are designed to
influence the marketplace of ideas, or unless they touch upon the actual
conscience of the individual actors comprising the corporation.
Beyond allowing for greater regulation of corporate disclosures and
more disaggregating of free speech liberties from economic
restrictions, the Supreme Court should draw clearer lines between
speech and conduct, especially for speech that implicates historically
disadvantaged groups. The speech about these groups should be
protected, but conduct causing further oppression can be more greatly
scrutinized.
C. Hate Speech and the Speech/Conduct Distinction
Many progressives champion creating an exception from First
Amendment protection for “hate speech.”213 America is exceptional
among Western democracies for protecting this type of speech.214 Despite
what appears to be vast misinformation among the public to the contrary,
hate speech is not an unprotected category of speech.215 This country’s
commitment to viewpoint neutrality, fundamental to our free speech
regime, mandates this bit of American exceptionalism. That said, the
Court should be vigilant to guard against transforming the necessary First
Amendment protections for hateful and bigoted speech, which
disproportionately harm historically disadvantaged groups, into a way for
free speech doctrine to produce an overabundance of outcomes that
undermine progressive causes.
210. Nat’l Inst. of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018).
211. Id. at 2377.
212. See id. at 2373 (“The notice in no way relates to the services that licensed clinics provide.
Instead, it requires these clinics to disclose information about state-sponsored services—including
abortion. . . .”).
213. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L. REV.
1596 (2010); MARI MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE
SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound; A Tort Action for
Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 143-45 (1982).
214. See Waldron, supra note 213, at 1597-98; see also Guy E. Carmi, Dignity--The Enemy from
Within: A Theoretical and Comparative Analysis of Human Dignity as a Free Speech Justification, 9 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 957, 988-89 (2007) (describing America’s approach, unique among Western
democracies, of favoring freedom of expression over the elusive concept of “human dignity”).
215. Ken White, Actually, Hate Speech is Protected Speech, L.A. TIMES (June 8, 2017).
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One way the Court can guard against hate speech protections rendering
the First Amendment too politically polarizing is to clarify, at an abstract
level, the distinctions between protected speech, which receives the
highest constitutional scrutiny, expressive conduct, which received
intermediate scrutiny, and unprotected conduct.216 In cases involving free
speech challenges to public accommodations laws,217 the Supreme Court
should clarify what constitutes pure speech and what constitutes
expressive conduct, thereby allowing public accommodations laws that
prevent discrimination in the provision of goods and services to trump
free speech rights when expressive conduct, and not pure speech, is at
issue.218 In a future case similar to Masterpiece Cakeshop,219 where the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission sued a Christian baker who refused to
make custom-design cakes for same-sex weddings, the Court must clarify
where First Amendment rights insulate people from public
accommodations laws. Perhaps a cake is expressive conduct, while the
words on a cake are pure speech.220 Or perhaps even stock phrases on a
cake are not pure speech, if they are commissioned by another,221 but
photographs—a traditional medium of artistic expression—are always
pure speech.222 Where the Court draws the line, in terms of restoring faith
in the First Amendment generally, may actually be less important than
creating a line that is clear, defensible, and consistently applied.223
Drawing the line between speech and expressive conduct in this arena will
not be obvious or easy, but creating clear jurisprudence and then applying
it consistently will be paramount to reducing concerns about First
Amendment cynicism.
The other increasingly relevant domain involving hate speech, where
courts will have to draw clear, meaningful lines, involves rallies by groups
216. See supra note 113.
217. This issue was presented in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138
S. Ct. 1719 (2018), but the Court decided the case on religious liberty grounds instead.
218. For deeper analysis on this issue, see Goldberg, supra note 50, 657–62.
219. See supra notes 197 & 219.
220. See Goldberg, supra note 50, at 660 (“The writing on a cake, if conveying a unique message,
likely should be considered pure speech . . . .”).
221. Id. (“Plus, the application of the expressive conduct test demonstrates that very little speech
appreciable by a reasonable observer would be compelled by requiring bakers to offer cakes on the same
terms to all customers. This application of the expressive conduct test further illustrates why a blank cake
should not be considered speech, but expressive conduct, in the first place.”).
222. This is the argument made in a brief by Dale Carpenter and Eugene Volokh. See Brief for
American Unity Fund & Profs. Dale Carpenter & Eugene Volokh as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No.
16-111), 2017 WL 4918194, at *14 (arguing that courts should treat as pure speech items, even those sold
in commerce, that use media traditionally associated with expression).
223. Surely, where the Supreme Court draws the line is highly significant for those affected by the
outcome of the case, but in terms of First Amendment and rule of law principles, clear line drawing that
maintains the doctrine’s nonpartisan and apolitical is paramount.
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associated with hateful speech or conduct. Currently, cities may attempt
to block rallies held by groups associated with white supremacist views,
especially after the deadly Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville,
Virginia.224 Unfortunately, many groups are going to have some number
of violent adherents, and the organizers of a rally should not be punished
in the form of censorship for the actions of members, and the government
cannot dent permits only to groups with certain viewpoints based on the
violent actions of outlier members, if groups with differing viewpoints
and potentially violent outlier members are granted rally permits.
However, if a hateful group is encouraging or inciting violence, the city
should not have to permit rallies for speech that has lost its protection due
to the necessarily high incitement standard.225
As an example, the City of Dayton initiated a lawsuit against the
Honorable Sacred Knights, an organization affiliated with the Ku Klux
Klan, and its leader Robert Morgan.226 The Honorable Sacred Knights
received a permit from Montgomery County to hold a rally at Courthouse
Square in Dayton,227 and the City alleged that this rally, which will
include 10 to more than 20 members, would constitute both an illegal
paramilitary operation and a public nuisance.228 Rally attendees had made
inflammatory, hateful posts to social media, have pointed guns at the
camera and held nooses, which, if the organizers or key members
reasonably expected to produce imminent lawless action and would
reasonably incite imminent lawless action, would rise to the level of
unprotected incitement.229 In addition, although the heckler’s veto
requires the police to protect speakers from violent reactions instead of
arresting speakers, if a city cannot protect its citizens, it is permitted to
disrupt speech to declare a state of emergency.230
That said, courts need to be extra cautious about finding that rally
organizers encourage violent conduct, because weakening the incitement
224. See Associated Press, James Alex Fields’ Trial in Deadly Charlottesville White Nationalist
Rally Set to Begin, NBCNEWS.COM (Nov. 26, 2018, 8:25 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/james-alex-fields-trial-deadly-charlottesville-white-nationalist-rally-set-n939991.
225. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (“[C]onstitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.”).
226. See Complaint, City of Dayton v. Honorable Sacred Knights and Robert Morgan, Case No.
2019 CV 01109 (Ohio. Civ. Div. Mar. 13, 2019.).
227. Chris Stewart, Klan Rally Permit Approved by Montgomery County: We Are Legally
DAILY
NEWS
(Feb.
22,2019),
Obligated,
DAYTON
https://www.daytondailynews.com/news/local/klan-rally-permit-approved-montgomery-county-arelegally-obligated/rusoUfEPag21x3WOlaw8WJ/.
228. See Complaint, supra note 226.
229. See supra note 120.
230. See supra note 177.
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standard is an easy way to pretextually discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint. Groups across the political spectrum have adherents who
advocate some forms of violence in some situations. Courts should be
reluctant to simply make the problem of white supremacist rallies go away
by declaring certain groups paramilitary organizations simply because
some members carry weapons – but may find that groups are unlawful
paramilitary entities if they train their members to use firearms for
violence, during rallies or otherwise.231 Ultimately, the City of Dayton
settled with the Honorable Sacred Knights, who were permitted to bring
some guns to the rally but not carry assault rifles.232 Only nine members
demonstrated, and no violence occurred, but protecting the city from
potential clashes between the Honorable Sacred Knights and the counter
protesters cost the city $650,000.233 This is a hefty price to pay, but much
of the security concern comes from the number of counter protesters, who,
far outnumbered the Honorable Sacred Knights members.234
One way out of our current vicious cycle of First Amendment cynicism
is to strengthen our commitment to protect even the most noxious, hateful
ideas, so long as they do not materialize into conduct. Progressives are
needed to commit themselves to this approach. Of course, hateful speech
disparages the historically marginalized based on identity characteristics,
and thus is speech especially antithetical to the progressive mission. To
convince progressives that this speech must be protected anyway,
progressives must first be given examples, like Black Lives Matter, or
even rock and roll music (and its relationship to suicide or homicide),235
where certain groups were blamed for the violent actions of their
adherents, or even perceived adherents.236
Thus, members of
231. See, e.g., City of Charlottesville v. Pa. Light Foot Militia, No. CL 17-560, 2018 WL 4698657,
at *7 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 7, 2018) (“Plaintiffs assert that Redneck Revolt along with the various other militiatype groups, assembled with the purpose of training, practicing with, and/or being instructed in the use of
firearms and other techniques… capable of causing injury or death. Plaintiffs also allege that Redneck
Revolt's intent was that its actions would be used in the context of and in furtherance of a civil disorder,
and such is planned in the future.”).
232. Chris Stewart, Dayton, Klan Group Reach Agreement over Guns, Masks, DAYTON DAILY
NEWS (May 14, 2019), https://www.daytondailynews.com/news/crime--law/dayton-klan-group-reachagreement-over-guns-masks/FXfI36HwAXFfGDAf7CBF8N/.
233. Donica Phifer, Ohio City Spends $650,000 for Security During Ku Klux Klan Rally,
NEWSWEEK (May 27, 2019), https://www.newsweek.com/ohio-city-spends-650000-security-during-kuklux-klan-rally-1436881.
234. Ari Berman, Nine Klan Members Showed Up to Their Ohio Rally. Six Hundred Anti-Racists
Came, Too, MOTHER JONES (May 26, 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/05/9-klanmembers-showed-up-to-their-ohio-rally-600-anti-racists-came-too/.
235. Peter Alan Block, Modern Day Sirens: Rock Lyrics and the First Amendment, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 777, 777–79 (1990) (discussing lawsuits filed against musicians and producers based on perceived
hidden messages or the content of the songs).
236. See, e.g., German Lopez, There’s Nothing Linking Black Lives Matter to a Texas Cop’s Death.
Fox News Did It Anyway, VOX (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.vox.com/2015/9/1/9239643/black-lives-
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organizations of various political stripes should remain concerned about
denying access to groups looking to organize or host marches or rallies.
Finally, allowing open access to speech in a public forum serves
progressive ideology, because it increases access to audiences for those
with less money and power. In this way, allowing even a Ku Klux Klanaffiliated group to march is consistent with the free speech as equality
approach to the First Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Loss of faith in the judiciary and rule of law ideals are a special concern
in the context of the First Amendment. Unless courts apply free speech
protections in nonpartisan ways that lead, on net, to apolitical outcomes,
the primary purpose of free speech rights is nullified even as the doctrine
is applied. Instead of the government’s engaging in viewpoint
discrimination, the courts will then have favored certain speech based on
its viewpoint. Both the political left and the right have been accused of
improper and politically motivated interpretations of the First
Amendment, but these accusations are overstated and can be
jurisprudentially dangerous.
To mitigate the current vicious cycle of First Amendment cynicism,
where perceptions of political applications of the doctrine lead to a loss
of faith in a politically neutral First Amendment regime, courts should
generally consider a libertarian approach to the First Amendment, but
must temper this with an egalitarian approach to the First Amendment in
cases of necessary government intervention, such as heckler’s veto cases.
Further, the Supreme Court can better manage its docket to select more
cases where the free speech as liberty and free speech as equality
conceptions overlap; should take specific measures to disentangle
economic rights from free speech rights; and should ensure that the
necessarily robust for hate speech do not insulate hateful conduct from
constitutional scrutiny. A restoration of faith in our First Amendment is
possible and may precipitate a reaffirmation of rule of law principles in
general.

matter-fox-news.
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